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Abstract
The revolution of Internet together with the progression in computer technology
makes it easy for institutions to collect unprecedented amount of personal data. This
pervasive data collection rally coupled with the increasing necessity of sharing of it
raised a lot of concerns about privacy. Widespread usage of data mining techniques,
enabling institutions to extract previously unknown and strategically useful information
from huge collections of data sets, and thus gain competitive advantages, has also
contributed to the fears about privacy.
One method to ensure privacy during disclosure is to selectively hide or generalize
the confidential information. However, with data mining techniques it is now possible
for an adversary to predict hidden or generalized confidential information using the rest
of the disclosed data set. We concentrate on one such possible threat, classification,
which is a data mining technique widely used for prediction purposes, and propose
algorithms that modify a given microdata set either by inserting unknown values (i.e.
deletion) or by generalizing the original values to prevent both probabilistic and decision
tree classification based inference.
To evaluate the proposed algorithms we experiment with real-life data sets. Re-
sults show that proposed algorithms successfully suppress microdata and prevent both
probabilistic and decision tree classification based inference. The hybrid versions of the
algorithms, which aim to suppress a confidential data value against both classification
models, block the inference channels with substantially less side effects. Similarly, the
enhanced versions of the algorithms, which aim to suppress multiple confidential data
values, reduce the side effects by nearly 50%.
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O¨zet
I˙nternet devrimi ve bilgisayar teknolojisinin ilerlemesi ile birlikte, kurumların daha
o¨nce benzeri go¨ru¨lmemis¸ miktarda kis¸isel veri toplaması mu¨mku¨n olmus¸tur. Yaygınlas¸an
veri toplama aktiviteleri, artan veri paylas¸ma ihtiyacı ile birles¸tig˘inde veri mahremiyeti
ile ilgili endis¸eleri tetiklemis¸tir. Ayrıca kurumların oldukc¸a bu¨yu¨k veri setlerinden
o¨nceden bilinmeyen ancak stratejik olarak faydalı bilgileri bulmasını sag˘layan veri maden-
cilig˘i tekniklerinin yaygınlas¸ması da mahremiyetle ilgili endis¸eleri arttırmıs¸tır.
Veri paylas¸ımı esnasında mahremiyeti sag˘lamanın bir yolu gizlenmesi gereken veri
alanlarının tek tek saklanması ya da genellenmesidir. Ancak, veri madencilig˘i teknikleri
ile ko¨tu¨ niyetli kullanıcıların verinin geri kalanını kullanarak, saklanmıs¸ ya da genel-
lenmis¸ veri alanlarını tahmin etmesi mu¨mku¨n olmaktadır. Bu tez kapsamında popu¨ler
tahminsel veri madencilig˘i tekniklerinden biri olan sınıflandırmaya odaklanılarak, ver-
ilen bir veri setini gerek veri alanlarını silerek gerekse genelleyerek gu¨ncelleyen, olasılıksal
ve karar ag˘acı ko¨kenli sınıflandırma tekniklerine dayalı c¸ıkarımları o¨nleyen algoritmalar
o¨nerilmektedir.
O¨nerilen algoritmaların performansları gerc¸ek veri setleri kullanılarak test edilmis¸tir.
Test sonuc¸ları, o¨nerilen algoritmaların veri setlerini bas¸arıyla baskıladıg˘ını ve hem
olasılıksal hem de karar ag˘acı ko¨kenli sınıflandırma tekniklerine dayalı c¸ıkarımları en-
gelledig˘ini go¨stermis¸tir. Algoritmaların aynı anda hem olasılıksal hem de karar ag˘acı
ko¨kenli sınıflandırma tekniklerine dayalı c¸ıkarımları o¨nleyen melez su¨ru¨mleri, gizli ver-
ileri c¸ok daha az yan etki ile saklamayı bas¸armıs¸tır. Benzer s¸ekilde, algoritmaların
birden fazla gizli veri alanını saklamayı hedefleyen gelis¸mis¸ su¨ru¨mlerinin, yan etkileri
%50 civarında azalttıg˘ı go¨zlenmis¸tir.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the main issue addressed and the necessary background for the
thesis. A brief description of our approaches and the outline of the structure of the
thesis are provided.
1.1 Background and Motivation
In tandem with the advances in networking and storage technologies, the private sec-
tor as well as the public sector has increased their efforts to gather, manipulate, and
commodify information on a large scale. Non-governmental organizations collect large
amounts of personal information about their customers or members for many reasons
including better customer relationship management and high-level decision making.
Public safety, on the other hand, is the major motivation for large-scale personal in-
formation collection efforts initiated by governmental organizations. This pervasive
data harvesting efforts coupled with the increasing need to share the data with other
institutions or with public raised concerns about privacy[3]. Privacy is the ability of
an individual to prevent information about himself becoming known to other people
without his approval [4]. More specifically, it is the right of individuals to have the
control over the data they provide. This includes controlling (1) how the data is going
to be used, (2) who is going to use it, and (3) for what purpose.
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Table 1.1: Academic Health Medical Records
Name Zipcode Gender Age Indigestion Chest Palpitation Diagnosis
Pain
Alice 90302 Female 29 Y N Y Dyspepsia
Bob 90410 Male 22 N Y Y Angina Pectoris
John 90301 Male 27 Y N N Dyspepsia
Lisa 90310 Female 43 Y N N Gastritis
Chris 90301 Male 52 N Y Y Gastritis
Leo 90410 Male 47 Y Y Y Angina Pectoris
Prue 90305 Female 30 N N Y Angina Pectoris
Joe 90402 Male 36 N Y Y Angina Pectoris
Ross 90301 Male 52 Y Y Y Gastritis
Widespread usage of powerful data analysis tools and data mining techniques, en-
abling institutions to extract previously unknown and strategically useful information
from huge collections of data sets, and thus gain competitive advantages, has also con-
tributed to the fears about privacy. Data mining techniques can be used for many
reasons including but not limited to national security warning and national security
decision making [1] for government agencies, and providing better business intelligence
and customer relationship management for enterprises. On the other hand, they can
also be used by adversaries to infer hidden confidential, i.e. sensitive, information about
individuals from the disclosed data sets, and thus pose a great threat to privacy. The
security and privacy threats due to use of data mining techniques was first pointed out
by O’Leary [43] and was discussed further in a symposium on knowledge discovery in
databases and personal privacy [44; 33; 45; 51]. Since then, privacy issues have become
one of the most important aspects of database and data mining research.
Example 1. Consider an on-line federation of hospitals and research organizations
collaborating with each other, named HealthFed. Each federated hospital collects
medical records of their patients together with their privacy preferences, and interacts
with research organizations within the federation to share this information. In partic-
ular, assume that the city clinic Academic Health and Academic Research Institute,
both being part of the HealthFed federation, collaborate with each other for research
purposes. More specifically, Academic Health shares patients’ medical records with
2
Table 1.2: Academic Health Medical Records Shared with Academic Research Institute
Zipcode Gender Age Indigestion Chest Palpitation Diagnosis
Pain
90302 Female 29 Y N Y Dyspepsia
90410 Male 22 N Y Y ?
90301 Male 27 Y N N Dyspepsia
90310 Female 43 Y N N Gastritis
90301 Male 52 N Y Y Gastritis
90410 Male 47 Y Y Y Angina Pectoris
90305 Female 30 N N Y Angina Pectoris
90402 Male 36 N Y Y Angina Pectoris
90301 Male 52 Y Y Y Gastritis
Academic Research Institute after ensuring the privacy preferences of each patient are
satisfied. Table 1.1 shows a set of such patients who gave consent to Academic Health to
disclose their medical records to third parties for research purposes provided that their
Name attribute is removed before disclosure. However, Bob, knowing that it might
still be possible to link his medical records with other data sources through potentially
identifying attributes like gender, zipcode, and age, required not only his name but
also his diagnosis information to be hidden before disclosure. Therefore, Academic
Health removed not only the Name attribute but also the diagnosis information from
Bob’s medical records before sharing it, as shown in Table 1.2. Unfortunately, given
these medical records, Academic Research Institute can easily find Bob’s diagnosis to
be Angina Pectoris using a predictive data mining technique called classification.
1.2 Our Approaches
In this work, we address this particular problem of privacy preserving microdata disclo-
sure. We assume that each individual might have different preferences regarding to their
privacy. Therefore, the confidential attributes might differ for each individual. In such
a setting, one method to ensure privacy while disclosing a microdata set is to selectively
hide (i.e. replace with a symbol denoting unknown) or generalize the confidential data
3
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Figure 1.1: Main Focus Areas of This Thesis
values. This method ensures privacy from a micro-level perspective. But, this is not
the case for the macro-level perspective, as with powerful data analysis tools and data
mining techniques it is now possible for an adversary to predict hidden or generalized
confidential information using the rest of the disclosed data set. We concentrate on
one such possible threat, classification, which is a data mining technique widely used
for prediction purposes, and propose algorithms that modify a given microdata set to
prevent both probabilistic and decision tree classification based inference. We select
Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 as typical representatives of probabilistic and decision tree
classifiers respectively, and develop our algorithms accordingly. Apart from avoiding
different inference types, the algorithms proposed either employ different modification
strategies or different downgrade strategies as pointed out in Figure 1.1.
More specifically, we design and implement the following algorithms which employ
different modification and downgrade strategies, and aim to avoid either probabilistic
or decision tree classification based inference.
1. The DECP and INCP algorithms suppress a single confidential data value against
Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier. These two algorithms downgrade the Na¨ıve Bayesian
classifier by identifying a set of data values from the rest of the data set that might
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cause confidential information to be inferred, and deleting them (i.e. replacing
them with a special symbol indicating unknown).
2. The DROPP and HID3 algorithms suppress a single confidential data value against
Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 classifiers respectively. These two algorithms downgrade
the microdata tuple containing the confidential data value. They identify a set
of data values from the microdata tuple itself that might cause confidential infor-
mation to be inferred, and delete them.
3. The DECP-G and INCP-G algorithms suppress a single confidential data value
against Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers. These two algorithms downgrade the Na¨ıve
Bayesian classifiers by identifying a set of data values from the rest of the data
set that might cause confidential information to be inferred, and generalizing
them.
4. The DROPP-G and HID3-G algorithms suppress a single confidential data value
against Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 classifiers respectively. These two algorithms
downgrade the microdata tuple containing the confidential data value. They
identify a set of data values from the microdata tuple itself that might cause
confidential information to be inferred, and generalize them.
5. The e-DECP and e-DROPP algorithms suppress multiple confidential data values
against Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers using the deletion modification strategy.
6. The e-DECP-G and e-DROPP-G algorithms suppress multiple confidential data
values against Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers using the generalization modification
strategy.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a brief introduction
to learning classifiers from a given training data set is given. We then formally define
5
the problem of suppressing microdata to prevent classification based inference, and give
a brief survey of the related work on privacy preserving data disclosure. In Chapter 3,
we present the microdata suppression algorithms that prevent classification based infer-
ence using the deletion modification strategy. We describe in detail how we downgrade
(i) the Naive Bayesian Classifier, and (ii) the microdata tuple to prevent inference of a
confidential data value. In Chapter 4, we present the microdata suppression algorithms
that prevent classification based inference using the generalization modification strat-
egy. We describe in detail how we downgrade (i) the Naive Bayesian Classifier, and (ii)
the microdata tuple to prevent inference of a confidential data value. Then, we present
the performance evaluation results of the proposed algorithms in Chapter 5. Finally,
we conclude the thesis in Chapter 6 where a summary and conclusions from this study
are given. Some interesting future research problems are also addressed in Chapter 6.
6
Chapter 2
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS AND RELATED
WORK
This chapter provides preliminary definitions and problem formulations for this thesis.
First, we describe the microdata suppression problem. Then, we define the modification
and downgrade strategies for microdata suppression. Next, we provide the metrics
that are used evaluate the proposed algorithms. Finally, we examine related work in
literature on protecting privacy while disclosing microdata.
2.1 Problem Formulation
Let Λ = {α1 , α2 , ..., αn} be the set of attributes with associated domains
1 V α1 , V α2 ,...,
V αn , and extended domains
2 eV α1 , eV α2 , ..., eV αn respectively. LetD = {d1 , d2 , ..., dm}
be the microdata set where each tuple di ∈ eV α1 × eV α2 × ...× eV αn is an ordered list
of values.
For each attribute αj ∈ Λ, there is a mapping αj [di ] : eV α1×eV α2×...×eV αn → eV αj
from eV α1 × eV α2 × ... × eV αn into the extended domain eV αj . The mapping αj [di ]
1The domain of an attribute is represented by a finite set of discrete values excluding the unknown
(i.e. null) value denoted by ν.
2The extended domain of an attribute is represented by a finite set of discrete values including the
unknown (i.e. null) value denoted by ν such that eV αj = V αj ∪ {ν}.
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represents the value of attribute αj of microdata tuple di .
Similarly, for each microdata set D, there is a mapping D[constraint] : D → S ∈ 2D
fromD = {d1 , d2 , ..., dm} into S ∈ 2
D . The mappingD[constraint] represents the set of
all tuples satisfying the constraint, expressed in conjunctive normal form, on attribute
values. Examples of valid constraint expressions include the following:
• α1 [d] = val1 ,
• ¬ α1 [d] = val1 ,
• αi [d] = vali ∧ ¬ αj [d] = valj , and
• α1 [d] = val1 ∧ α2 [d] = val2 ∧ ... ∧ αn [d] = valn .
Definition 2.1. Classifiers(Σ). Σ denotes the set of all classifiers that aims to
predict the value of a single attribute, i.e. the target attribute3 ατ , in terms of the
predictor attributes4.
Each classifier ς ∈ Σ is defined in the context of a training data set and a target
attribute. For example, a classifier of type Na¨ıve Bayesian (i.e. NB) built using the
data set D with ατ ∈ Λ as the target attribute is denoted as ςnb
D ,ατ . If the type of the
classifier, the training data set or the target attribute is unknown or not relevant in a
given context, then a special symbol ⊥ is used instead of the respective symbol. For
example, ς⊥
D ,ατ denotes the set of all classifiers built using the data set D with ατ ∈ Λ
as the target attribute. Following the training phase, each classifier ς ∈ Σ can be viewed
as a function that takes a microdata tuple and predicts the most probable value of the
target attribute based on other attributes’ values. For example, if ς ∈ ς⊥
⊥,ατ then
ς : (eV α1 × eV α2 × . . .× eV αn )→ V ατ .
Definition 2.2. Na¨ıve Bayesian Classifier(Σnb). Let the j
th attribute value of tuple
di , that is αj [di ], is unknown. According to Bayes’ theorem the probability that αj [di ]
3Also called the class attribute or the dependent attribute
4Also called the independent attributes
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has value v ∈ V αj is equal to the posterior probability of v conditioned on di and is
given by
p(v|di) =
p(v)p(di |v)
p(di)
(2.1)
where p(v) and p(di) are the prior probabilities of v and di respectively, and p(di |v) is
the posterior probability of di conditioned on v. Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier is a prob-
abilistic classifier based on Bayes’ theorem with the class conditional independence
assumption, that is, the effect of an attribute value on another attribute (i.e. class
attribute) is independent of the values of the remaining attributes. Due to class con-
ditional independence assumption, we can rewrite the posterior probability p(di |v) as
follows:
p(di |v) =
∏
j−1
k=1p(αk [di ]|v)
∏
n
k=j+1p(αk [di ]|v) (2.2)
The Na¨ıve Bayesian Classifier ςnb
D−d i ,αj built using D − di as the training data set
will predict the most probable value for αj [di ] as vpi ∈ V αj if and only if the following
condition holds:
p(vpi|di) > p(v|di) | ∀v ∈ V αj − vpi (2.3)
Since p(di) is same for all v ∈ V αj , it can be ignored as shown below:
p(vpi)p(di |vΠ ) > p(v)p(di |v) | ∀v ∈ V αj − vpi (2.4)
Definition 2.3. ID3 Classifier (Σid3 ) Let αj [di ] be unknown. The ID3 classifier
ς id3
D−d i ,αj built using D − di as the training data set is a decision tree where each
internal node represents a decision node, each branch represents an outcome of the
decision and each leaf node represents a possible value v ∈ V αj for αj [di ]. Such a
classifier will predict the most probable value for αj [di ] as vpi ∈ V αj if and only if the
test of the remaining attributes of di against the decision tree leads a path from the root
node to a leaf node labeled with vpi.
Definition 2.4. Suppressing a Confidential Data Value. Let D′ be the microdata
set after applying a set of modifications to D. The confidential data value αj [di ] will be
suppressed with respect to D′, if and only if there exist no classifiers that can correctly
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predict the confidential data value.
ς(di
′) 6= αj [di ] ∀ς ∈ ς⊥
D ′−d i
′,αj (2.5)
In this work, we relax the above statement such that there exists no Na¨ıve Bayesian or
ID3 classifier that can correctly predict the confidential data value.
ς(di
′) 6= αj [di ] ∀ς ∈ ςnb
D ′−d i
′,αj ∪ ς id3
D ′−d i
′,αj (2.6)
2.2 Modification Strategies for Microdata Suppres-
sion
There are two possible modification strategies that can be adopted to address the
microdata suppression problem.
Modification Strategy 1. Deleting an Attribute Value. This modification
scheme, also referred to as hiding, involves replacement of attribute values, includ-
ing the confidential data value(s), with a special symbol denoting the unknown (i.e.
null) value ν. Replacing attribute values with ν results in uncertainty in the micro-
data set. For example, in the simplest case of a binary attribute, an unknown value
can be either 0 or 1. Assuming that the value was 0 will contribute to the resulting
classification model in a contradicting way compared to the assumption that it was 1.
By carefully hiding instances of certain attributes, we can decrease the precision of the
classification models which can then be used to predict the confidential data values.
Definition 2.5. Taxonomy. A taxonomy T i for an attribute αi is a tree structured
concept hierarchy in the form of a partially ordered set (eV αi ,≺), where eV αi is the
extended domain that enumerates all possible attribute values of αi , and ≺ is the partial
order that specifies is-a relationships among attribute values in eV αi . Figure 2.1 shows
the taxonomy for the disease attribute.
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Figure 2.1: Disease Taxonomy
Modification Strategy 2. Generalizing an Attribute Value. Let us assume that
T = {T 1 , T 2 , ..., T n} represents the ordered set of taxonomies associated with attributes
Λ = {α1 , α2 , ..., αn} respectively. This modification scheme involves generalization of
attribute values, including the confidential data value(s), using the set of taxonomies
T .
2.3 Downgrade Strategies for Microdata Suppres-
sion
There are two possible downgrade strategies that can be adopted to address the micro-
data suppression problem.
Downgrade Strategy 1. Classification Model Downgrade. Let D be the original
microdata set with the confidential data value αj [di ]. Classification model downgrade
aims to transform the original microdata set D to D′ which satisfies the following
constraints:
i. The confidential data value αj [di ] is either deleted or generalized,
ii. The tuple containing the confidential data value is not modified. The only
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exception to this is the confidential data value which is either deleted or
generalized,
∀α ∈ Λ− αj , α[di
′] = α[di ]
iii. The remaining tuples of the microdata set are modified if and only if there
exists at least one classifier that can correctly predict the actual confidential
data value,
D − di 6= D
′ − di
′, iff ∃ς ∈ ς⊥
D−d i ,αj ς(di) = αj [di ]
iv. There exists no classifiers that can correctly predict the actual confidential
data value using the modified microdata set.
∀ς ∈ ς⊥
D ′−d i
′,αj ς(di
′) 6= αj [di ]
This scheme aims at downgrading all classification models ς ∈ ς⊥
D ′−d i
′,αj by modifying
the tuples d ∈ D − di .
Downgrade Strategy 2. Microdata Tuple Downgrade. Let D be the original
microdata set with the confidential data value αj [di ]. Microdata tuple downgrade aims
to transform the original microdata setD to D′ which satisfies the following constraints:
i. The confidential data value αj [di ] is either deleted or generalized,
ii. Remaining attribute values of the tuple containing the confidential data
value are modified if and only if there exists at least one classifier that can
correctly predict the actual confidential data value,
∃α ∈ Λ− αj , α[di
′] 6= α[di ], iff ∃ς ∈ ς⊥
D−d i ,αj ς(di) = αj [di ],
iii. The remaining tuples of the microdata set, which constitute the training
data set for classifier construction, are not modified,
D − di = D
′ − di
′
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iv. The classifiers built using the modified microdata set are the same as the
ones built using the original data set,
ς⊥
D ′−d i
′,αj = ς⊥
D−d i ,αj
v. There exists no classifiers that can correctly predict the actual confidential
data value using the modified microdata tuple.
∀ς ∈ ς⊥
D−d i ,αj , ς(di
′) 6= αj [di ]
Unlike the classification model downgrade, this scheme downgrades only the microdata
tuple containing the confidential data value di , such that the classifiers ς ∈ ς⊥
D−d i ,αj
cannot correctly predict the confidential data value αj [di ].
2.4 Evaluation Measures
The two important issues in microdata suppression are; (1) minimization of informa-
tion loss enabling further use of the modified microdata set, and (2) maximization of
uncertainty enabling protection of confidential data values from classification based in-
ference. In the following, seven metrics for measuring information loss and uncertainty
incurred by the suppression process are introduced respectively.
2.4.1 Information Loss Metrics
Within the scope of this thesis, three different metrics are used to measure the informa-
tion loss: the Direct Distance, Sum of Kullback Leibler Distances and Average Change
in Mutual Information.
The Direct Distance, the simplest of all information loss metrics, basically counts
the number of attribute values hidden during the suppression process.
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Definition 2.6. Direct Distance. Let D and D′ be the original and modified mi-
crodata sets respectively. The direct distance between D and D′ can be defined as the
number of non-matching attribute values.
DD(D,D′) =
∑
i=1
m
∑
j=1
ndistij (2.7)
where
distij =


0 if αj [di ] = αj [di
′]
1 otherwise
The second information loss metric, utilized within the scope of this thesis, is the Sum
of Kullback Leibler Distances. This metric measures the information loss in terms of
the distance between the first order probability distributions of the original and the
modified microdata sets.
Definition 2.7. Kullback Leibler Distance. Let D and D′ be the original and mod-
ified microdata sets respectively. Let α ∈ Λ be an attribute with probability distribution
pα in D and pα
′ in D′. The Kullback Leibler distance between D and D′ in terms of
attribute α can be defined as the distance between the first order probability distributions
of α in D and D′.
KLD(D,D′) = D(pα||pα
′) =
∑
v∈V αpα(v)log
pα(v)
pα′(v)
(2.8)
Definition 2.8. Sum of Kullback Leibler Distances. Let D and D′ be the original
and modified microdata sets respectively. The sum of Kullback Leibler distances between
D and D′ over all attributes α ∈ Λ can be defined as follows.
SKLD(D,D′) =
∑
α∈ΛD(pα||pα
′) (2.9)
The last information loss metric, utilized within the scope of this thesis, is the Average
Change in Mutual Information. This metric measures the information loss by finding
the average change in joint probability distributions of all attributes.
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Definition 2.9. Mutual Information. Let αk ∈ Λ and αl ∈ Λ be two attributes
of the microdata set D with probability distributions pαk and pαl respectively, and joint
probability distribution pαk ,αl . The mutual information between αk and αl in D, mea-
suring their mutual dependence, can be defined as follows.
ID(αk , αl) = D(pαk ,αl ||pαkpαl )
=
∑
vk∈V αk
∑
v l∈V αl
pαk ,αl (vk , vl)log
pαk ,αl (vk , vl)
pαkpαl
(2.10)
Definition 2.10. Average Change in Mutual Information. Let D and D′ be
the original and modified microdata sets respectively. The average change in mutual
information over all attributes α ∈ Λ can be defined as follows.
ACMI(D,D′) =
2
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=i
n ID (αi ;αj )
ID′ (αi ;αj )
n(n− 1)
(2.11)
2.4.2 Uncertainty Metrics
The Sum of Conditional Entropies is used to measure the uncertainty introduced into
the modified microdata set.
Definition 2.11. Conditional Entropy. Let D and D′ be the original and modified
microdata sets respectively, and α ∈ Λ be an attribute. Let Xα
D on eV α be a random
variable with instances α[d1 ], α[d2 ], ..., α[dm ] and probability distribution pα. Let Xα
D ′
on eV α be a random variable with instances α[d1
′], α[d2
′], ..., α[dm
′] and probability
distribution pα
′. The conditional entropy of Xα
D given Xα
D ′ can be defined as follows.
H(Xα
D |Xα
D ′) = −
∑
v∈V α
∑
v ′∈eV αp(v, v
′)log(p(v|v′)) (2.12)
Definition 2.12. Sum of Conditional Entropies. Let D and D′ be the original
and modified microdata sets respectively. The sum of conditional entropies of D given
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D′ can be defined as follows.
SCE(D,D′) =
∑
α∈ΛH(Xα
D |Xα
D ′) (2.13)
The detailed descriptions of the information theoretic metrics introduced in this section
can be found in [11].
2.5 Related Work
The problem of protecting privacy while disclosing public-use data sets were previously
investigated in the context of statistical databases (SDBs) as the statistical disclosure
limitation problem (also referred to as the inference problem)[5].The statistics literature,
motivated by the need to publish statistical data sets with one or more contingency
tables containing aggregate statistics, focused on identifying and protecting sensitive
cells which may lead to derivation of aggregate confidential information. An extensive
survey of statistical database security can be found in [5] and more recent work on
disclosure control in statistical databases can be found in [17; 22]. According to [5] the
methods proposed for securing SDBs from inference attacks can be mainly classified into
four categories:conceptual, query restriction, data perturbation and output perturbation.
Conceptual approaches include techniques that detect and remove inference channels
during the database design mainly at the conceptual data model level. Query restriction
approaches provide protection by restricting the query set size, controlling the overlap
among successive queries, or making query results of small size unavailable to users of
the database. On the other hand, data perturbation approaches introduce noise in the
data by transforming the original database into a perturbed one. These approaches
either replace the whole data set with a new one coming from the same probability
distribution or perturb some of the attribute values once and for all. Finally, the
output perturbation approaches perturb the answer to queries while leaving the data
in the database unchanged.
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One popular disclosure protection approach is cell suppression [12; 49]. Cell suppres-
sion consists of two sub-approaches:primary suppression and secondary (i.e. comple-
mentary) suppression. The basic idea of primary cell suppression is to find all sensitive
cells that might cause confidential information to be disclosed from the released statis-
tical data set and replace them by a symbol indicating the suppression. Yet primary
suppression itself is not enough to protect the sensitive cells due to inference channels
existing in the data set. In order to reach the desired protection for sensitive cells,
other cells, i.e. marginal totals, containing nonconfidential information that might lead
to inference of suppressed sensitive cells also needs to be suppressed; this is called
secondary (complementary) cell suppression. Moreover, while finding a set of comple-
mentary suppressions protecting all sensitive cells, the information loss associated with
the suppressed entries have to be minimized. This combinatorial optimization problem
is known as the Cell Suppression Problem (CSP) in statistics literature. Since CSP be-
longs to the class of NP-hard problems [25; 31; 32], many heuristic methods have been
proposed including but not limited to [12; 23; 24; 32; 49] (see [61] for more references)
to address the problem. CSP problem is similar to the Microdata Suppression Problem
(MSP) that this work tries to address. Nevertheless, the methodologies used to address
these problems are quite different due to the difference in the types of data sets they
are trying to protect. In statistical data sets, inference results from the marginal totals
given along with the data itself. On the other hand, in microdata sets inference results
from the statistical correlations between attributes like income and education.
Another popular disclosure protection approach that belongs to data perturbation
family is microaggregation [20; 26; 34; 36; 41; 50; 52; 59]. Different from cell suppres-
sion, microaggregation aims at protecting numeric microdata by clustering individual
records into small aggregates and replacing actual values of individual records by group
means prior to publication. As Ferrer et al. pointed out in his work [20], microaggre-
gation assumes that confidentiality rules in use allow publication of microdata sets if
the individual records correspond to groups of k or more individuals. While an efficient
polynomial algorithm exists for optimal univariate microaggregation [26], microaggre-
gation of multivariate data guaranteeing minimum information loss is known to be
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NP-hard [41]. Hence, several heuristic methods have been proposed [20; 50; 34] to
address this problem. Recently, new heuristics employing genetic algorithms have been
proposed to further lower the information loss [36; 52]. Moreover, microaggregation has
been extended to handle categorical data by means of employing different clustering al-
gorithms [59]. Different from MSP problem, microaggregation assumes all respondents
contributed to the microdata set have the same privacy preferences. It is meaningful
to use microaggregation in such a setting where sensitive attributes are the same for all
respondents. Nevertheless, if respondents’ privacy preferences differ then it will result
unnecessary attribute values to be generalized meaning more information loss.
The security and privacy issues arising from the inference problem, which results in
private-sensitive data to be inferred from public-insensitive data, has also been invasti-
gated by multilevel secure databases research [30; 39; 46; 53; 54] and general purpose
databases research [9; 13; 14; 28]. Methods proposed within the database context
mainly focus on detection and removal of meta-data (i.e. database constraints like
functional and multi-valued dependencies) based inferences either during database de-
sign [14; 27; 39; 54] or during query time [15; 53; 57]. However, they do not take into
account the statistical correlations among database attributes which can be discovered
by various data mining techniques and hence result in imprecise inferences like the rule
‘A implies B’ with 25% confidence.
There are also other approaches investigating the privacy issues arising during micro-
data disclosure within the scope of anonymization problem. K-anonymity, [47; 48; 55],
being one of those approaches, aims at preserving the anonymity during the data dis-
semination process using generalizations and suppressions on potentially identifying
portions of the data set. While k-anonymity protects against identity disclosure, it is
insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure. To address this limitation of k-anonymity,
Machanavajjhala et al. [37] recently introduced a new notion of privacy, called `-
diversity, which requires that the distribution of a sensitive attribute in each equiva-
lence class has at least well-represented values. One problem with `-diversity is that
it is limited in its assumption of adversarial knowledge. It is possible for an adversary
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to gain information about a sensitive attribute as long as s/he has information about
the global distribution of this attribute. Li et al. [35] addresses this particular problem
by t-closeness which formalizes the idea of global background knowledge by requiring
that the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is close to the
distribution of the attribute in the overall table (i.e., the distance between the two dis-
tributions should be no more than a threshold t). This effectively limits the amount of
individual-specific information an observer can learn. Other approaches addressing the
anonymization problem include [18; 19; 29; 42; 37; 35]. In his work [29], Iyengar uses
suppression and generalization approaches to satisfy privacy constraints. Moreover, he
examines the tradeoff between privacy and information loss within different data usage
contexts and proposes a genetic algorithm to find the optimal anonymization. On the
other hand, in [42] Øhrn et al. uses boolean reasoning, and in [18; 19] Ferrer et al. uses
microaggregation to address the anonymization problem. Besides the fact that these ap-
proaches successfully preserve privacy through anonymization, none of them addresses
the inference threat to privacy due to data mining approaches. Therefore, they do
not directly apply to MSP. Moreover, similar to the microaggregation, anonymization
approaches assume that each respondent who contributes to the microdata set has the
same privacy preferences, i.e. wants to be anonymous, which is not realistic.
Another approach, proposed by Wang et al. [60], addresses the threats caused by
data mining abilities, using a template-based approach. The proposed approach aims
to (1) preserve the information for a given classification analysis, and (2) limit the
usefulness of unwanted sensitive inferences, i.e. classification rules, that may be derived
from the data. More specifically, it focuses on suppressing sensitive rules, instead of
sensitive data values.
The work closest to ours is proposed by Chang et al.[10]. In his work, Chang
proposes a new paradigm for dealing with the inference problem, which combines the
application of decision tree analysis with the concept of parsimonious downgrading. He
shows how classification models can be used to predict suppressed confidential data
values and concludes that some feedback mechanism is needed to protect suppressed
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data values against classification models.
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Chapter 3
SUPPRESSING MICRODATA TO PREVENT
CLASSIFICATION BASED INFERENCE USING
DELETION
As pointed in Section 2, hiding a confidential data value alone may not be enough to
protect it, in case the whole data set is going to be disclosed. This results from the
fact that an adversary can build a classification model using the rest of the data set
as the training data set and s/he could use it to predict the actual confidential data
value. In order to avoid such attacks, we propose four algorithms suppressing only one
confidential data value at a time, against two popular classifier types: probabilistic and
decision tree classifiers, as shown in Figure 3. We have selected Na¨ıve Bayesian and
ID3 as typical representatives of probabilistic and decision tree classifiers respectively,
and developed our heuristics accordingly. Moreover, we propose enhancement to two of
the proposed algorithms to suppress multiple confidential data values with fewer side
effects.
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Against Probabilistic Classifiers
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Figure 3.1: Taxonomy of Microdata Suppression Algorithms using Deletion Modifica-
tion Technique
3.1 Suppression Against Probabilistic Classification
Models
In the following, we present three algorithms for preventing probabilistic classification
based inference. The proposed algorithms aim to suppress a confidential data value,
such that it is no longer among the Top-1 Probable value set.
Definition 3.1. Top-k Probable. Let αj [di ] be confidential, thus be replaced by ν.
The Na¨ıve Bayesian Classifier ςnb
D−d i ,αj built using D− di as the training data set will
predict the Top-k Probable value set for αj [di ] as Ωk
αj [d i ] ⊆ V αj . The Top-k Probable
value set satisfies the following constraints.
i. It’s size is equal to k. ∣∣Ωkαj [d i ]∣∣ = k (3.1)
ii. The probability of αj [di ] being equal to the least probable value in the Top-k Probable
value set is greater than the probability of αj [di ] being equal to the most probable value
among the remaining attribute values.
p(ω|di) > p(v|di) | ∀v ∈ V αj − Ωk
αj [d i ] ∧ ω ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] (3.2)
The proposed suppression algorithms aim at either reducing p(αj [di ]|di) below that
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of a randomly selected attribute, called the Random Next Best Guess, among Top-k
Probable value set or increasing the probability of a set of selected attributes, called
the Next Best Guess Set, above p(αj [di ]|di).
Definition 3.2. Random Next Best Guess. The random next best guess, vrnbg ∈
V αj , is a randomly selected value from V αj satisfying the following conditions.
i. It is different from αj [di ].
vrnbg 6= αj [di ] (3.3)
ii. It is among the Top-k Probable value set.
vrnbg ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] (3.4)
iii. The probability of αj
th attribute of di being equal to vrnbg is smaller than that of
confidential data value αj [di ] and greater than zero.
p(αj [di ]|di) > p(vrnbg |di) > 0 (3.5)
Definition 3.3. Next Best Guess Set. The next best guess set, Snbg ⊆ Ωk
αj [d i ], for
microdata tuple di is the set of all attribute values v ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] − αj [di ] satisfying the
following condition.
Snbg =
{
v|v ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] − αj [di ] ∧ p(v|di) ≥ p(vrnbg |di)
}
(3.6)
3.1.1 DECP Algorithm
The DECP algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ] so that
it cannot be correctly predicted by the downgraded classification model ςnb
D ′−d i ,αj . It
accomplishes its goal by decreasing the probability p(αj [di ]|di) below that of the random
next best guess vrnbg .
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Definition 3.4. Maximum Impact Attribute. The attribute with maximum impact
on p(αj [di ]|di), denoted by αMI
αj [d i ], is the one that satisfies the following conditions.
αMI
αj [d i ] = argmin α∈Λ (|D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ α[d] = α[di ]]− di |)
∧ |D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ α[d] = α[di ]]− di | > 1 (3.7)
Definition 3.5. Maximum Impact Data Values. The maximum impact data
values are the instances of αMI
αj [d i ] in tuples d ∈ D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d] =
αMI
αj [d i ][di ]] excluding di .
In each iteration, the DECP algorithm identifies the maximum impact attribute
αMI
αj [d i ] and modifies the tuples d, such that d ∈ D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d] =
αMI
αj [d i ][di ]] − di , by replacing αMI
αj [d i ][d] with ν until the goal is achieved, that is
until p(αj [di ]|di) becomes less than p(vrnbg |di). Each such replacement results in the
maximum possible reduction in p(αj [di ]|di), thus requiring less number of modifications.
Theorem 3.1. Let αMI
αj [d i ] be the maximum impact attribute satisfying Equation (3.7).
Then, every replacement of a maximum impact data value with ν causes the maximum
decrease in p(αj [di ]|di), thus resulting in fewer data values to be modified.
Proof: Let us first find the effect of replacing a maximum impact data value with ν
on p(αj [di ]) p(di |αj [di ]). Remember that, since p(di) is same for all v ∈ V αj , it can be
ignored when calculating p(αj [di ]|di).
p(αj [di ]|di) =
p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
p(di)
∼= p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
∼= p(αj [di ])p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ])
×
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
Let us assume that;
• F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ] be the size of the microdata set D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d]
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= αMI
αj [d i ][di ]]− di , and
• Fαj [d i ] be the size of the microdata set D[αj [d] = αj [di ]]− di .
Single replacement of a maximum impact data value causes p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ]) to
decrease from
F
αj [di ],αMI
αj [di ]
Fαj [di ]
to
F
αj [di ],αMI
αj [di ]
−1
Fαj [di ]
. This, in turn decreases p(di |αj [di ]) by
F
αj [di ],αMI
αj [di ]
−1
F
αj [di ],αMI
αj [di ]
as shown below.
p′(di |αj [di ]) =
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p
′(α[di ]|αj [di ])× p
′(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ])
=
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])×
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ] − 1
Fαj [d i ]
=
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])×
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ] − 1
Fαj [d i ]
×
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
=
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])× p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ])
×
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ] − 1
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
= p(di |αj [di ])×
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ] − 1
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
Now let us assume that there is another attribute αk which decreases p(αj [di ]|di) more
than that of αMI
αj [d i ]. This implies the following.
Fαj [d i ],αk − 1
Fαj [d i ],αk
<
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ] − 1
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
(Fαj [d i ],αk − 1)Fαj [d i ],αMIαj [di ] < (Fαj [d i ],αMIαj [di ] − 1)Fαj [d i ],αk
Fαj [d i ],αk < Fαj [d i ],αMIαj [di ]
which contradicts the definition ofMaximum Impact Attribute. So, we can conclude that
every replacement of a maximum impact data value with ν causes the highest decrease
in p(αj [di ]|di) which in turn implies that the number of data values that should be
modified is minimal¤
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The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the
algorithm verifies the need for suppression. It finds p(v|di) for all v ∈ V αj and checks
the truth value of the following assertion:
p(αj [di ]|di) > p(v|di)|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ] (3.8)
If Assertion (3.8) is true, it picks a random next best guess vrnbg from V αj . Next, in each
iteration it finds the maximum impact attribute αMI
αj [d i ] and replaces the maximum
impact data values by ν as long as p(αj [di ]|di) > p(vrnbg |di). After proccessing all
maximum impact attributes, it re-checks the truth value of Assertion (3.8). If Assertion
(3.8) is still true, it reverts all changes and deletes the tuple di from the microdata set.
An overview of the algorithm is provided in Figure 3.1.1.
If |V αj | = 2 is true, then suppressing the confidential data value might result in
an adversary guessing it correctly with 100% confidence. Therefore, the decision to
suppress a confidential data value is randomized for the case where |V αj | = 2. This
results in an adversary guessing the actual confidential data value with 50% confidence
which is the maximum uncertainty that can be achieved under such circumstances.
Lemma 3.1. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value, n be the number of attributes
and N be the number of tuples in D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] − di . Then, the upper bound for
the number of data values that can be modified by the DECP algorithm is equal to
(n− 1)(N − 1).
Proof: The DECP algorithm modifies the maximum impact data values from the tu-
ples d ∈ D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d] = αMI
αj [d i ][di ]] − di . As D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧
αMI
αj [d i ][d] = αMI
αj [d i ][di ]] ⊆ D[αj [d] = αj [di ]], the number of tuples that can be mod-
ified for each maximum impact attribute is bounded by N − 1. At each iteration,
the DECP algorithm picks a different maximum impact attribute and replaces the in-
stances of this attribute with ν. Since, there are n − 1 different alternatives for a
maximum impact attribute, we can conclude that the DECP algorithm can replace at
most (n− 1)(N − 1) data values with ν for suppressing a confidential data value ¤
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
Find probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V αj
If p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ] {
If |V αj | = 2
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg among Ωk
αj [d i ]
While p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(vrnbg |di ) and candidates for maximum impact attribute exist {
Find the maximum impact attribute αMI
αj [d i ]
Find the maximum impact data values
Count = |D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d] = αMI
αj [d i ][di ]]|
While p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(vrnbg |di ) and Count > 1 {
Replace the next data value in maximum impact data values with ν
p(αj [di ]|di )∗ =
Count−1
Count
Count = Count− 1
}
}
If p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ] {
Revert all changes
Delete microdata tuple di
}
Else
Replace αj [di ] with ν
}
END
ATTRIBUTE FindMaximumImpactAttributeForDECP(D,di ,αj ) {
count = |D|
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj {
countα = number of all tuples d ∈ D − di satisfying the constraint
αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ α[d] = α[di ]
If countα < count and countα > 1{
count = countα
αMI
αj [d i ] = α
}
}
return αMI
αj [d i ]
}
Figure 3.2: Pseudocode of DECP Algorithm
Example 2. Now, let us illustrate how the DECP algorithm suppresses Bob’s confi-
dential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model is constructed to find the prob-
abilities p(v|di) for all v ∈ V αj = {dyspepsia, angina pectoris, gastritis}. The Na- ı¨ve
Bayesian classification model constructed using the medical records of Table 1.2 is shown
in Table 3.1. According to the model p(dyspepsia|d2 ) = 0, p(angina pectoris|d2 ) =
1
6
,
and p(gastritis|d2 ) =
1
18
.
Step 2. The probability p(angina pectoris|d2 ) is greater than both p(dyspepsia|d2 ) and
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Table 3.1: Na¨ıve Bayesian Classification Model Constructed Using the Medical Records
Shown in Table 1.2
p(Symptom|Diagnosis)
Diagnosis p(Diagnosis) Indigestion Chest Pain Palpitation p(Diagnosis|d2 )
Dyspepsia 2/8 0 0 1/2 0
Gastritis 3/8 1/3 2/3 2/3 1/18
Angina Pectoris 3/8 2/3 2/3 1 1/6
p(gastritis|d2 ). As Bob’s diagnosis can be correctly predicted, the suppression process
starts.
Step 3. Let’s assume that gastritis is selected as the random next best guess. From
this point on the DECP algorithm will try to decrease p(angina pectoris|d2 ) below
p(gastritis|d2 ).
Step 4. To select the maximum impact attribute, the counts for each symptom attribute
is found as follows;
• countI = |D[diagnosis[d] = diagnosis[d2 ] ∧ indigestion[d] = indigestion[d2 ]]| = 2
• countCP = |D[diagnosis[d] = diagnosis[d2 ] ∧ chestpain[d] = chestpain[d2 ]]| = 2
• countP = |D[diagnosis[d] = diagnosis[d2 ] ∧ palpitation[d] = palpitation[d2 ]]| = 3
Both indigestion and chest pain attributes have the minimum count. Therefore, they
are the candidates for the maximum impact attribute. Let’s assume that indigestion is
selected as the maximum impact attribute.
Step 5. All tuples d satisfying the constraint indigestion [d] = N ∧ diagnosis[d] =
angina pectoris are found. Tuples 7 and 8 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 6. The indigestion attribute is hidden from tuple 7. With this replacement
p(angina pectoris|d2 ) decreases by
1
2
to 1
12
. As p(angina pectoris|d2 ) is still greater
than p(gastritis|d2 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum impact
attribute which is chest pain.
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Table 3.2: Academic Health Medical Records After DECP Execution
Zipcode Gender Age Indigestion Chest Palpitation Diagnosis
Pain
90302 Female 29 Y N Y Dyspepsia
90410 Male 22 N Y Y ?
90301 Male 27 Y N N Dyspepsia
90310 Female 43 Y N N Gastritis
90301 Male 52 N Y Y Gastritis
90410 Male 47 Y ? Y Angina Pectoris
90305 Female 30 ? N Y Angina Pectoris
90402 Male 36 N Y Y Angina Pectoris
90301 Male 52 Y Y Y Gastritis
Step 7. All tuples d satisfying the constraint chestpain[d] = Y ∧ diagnosis[d] =
angina pectoris are found. Tuples 6 and 8 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 8. The chest pain attribute is hidden from tuple 6. With this replacement
p(angina pectoris|d2 ) decreases by
1
2
to 1
24
. As p(angina pectoris|d2 ) is smaller than
p(gastritis|d2 ), the suppression process stops. The resulting microdata set can be seen
in Table 3.2.
3.1.2 INCP Algorithm
The INCP algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ], so that it
cannot be correctly predicted by the downgraded classification model ςnb
D ′−d i ,αj . It
accomplishes its goal, as its name implies, by increasing the probabilities p(v|di) for all
v in the next best guess set,Snbg , above p(αj [di ] | di).
For each v ∈ Snbg , the INCP algorithm identifies the tuples d ∈ D[αj [d] = v] having
no common attribute value with di and modifies them by replacing αj [d] with ν in order
to increase p(v|di).
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the
algorithm verifies the need for suppression. It finds p(v|di) for all v ∈ V αj and checks
the truth value of Assertion (3.8).If Assertion (3.8) is true, it picks a random next
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
Find probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V αj
If p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ] {
If |V αj | = 2
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg among Ωk
αj [d i ]
Snbg = All attribute values v ∈ V αj satisfying p(v|di ) ≥ p(vrnbg |di )
For each v ∈ Snbg {
While p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di ) and D[αj [d] = v] 6= empty {
T = next tuple in D[αj [d] = v]
If T ∩ di = empty {
Replace αj [T ] with ν
Recalculate probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V αj
}
}
}
If p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ]
Run algorithm DECP
Else
Replace αj [di ] with ν
}
END
Figure 3.3: Pseudocode of INCP Algorithm
best guess vrnbg from V αj and forms Snbg by finding the attribute values v ∈ V αj
satisfying p(v|di) ≥ p(vrnbg |di). Next, for each v ∈ Snbg , the algorithm finds the tuples
d ∈ D[¬ α1 [d] = α1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ αj−1 [d] = αj−1 [di ] ∧ αj [d] = v ∧ ¬ αj+1 [d] =
αj+1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ αn [d] = αn [di ]] and modifies them by replacing αj [d] with ν until
the goal is achieved, that is until p(v|di) becomes less than or equal to p(αj [di ]|di).
After proccessing all attribute values v ∈ Snbg , it re-checks the truth value of Assertion
(3.8). If Assertion (3.8) is still true, then DECP algorithm is executed to complete the
algorithm. An overview of the algorithm is provided in Figure 3.1.2.
Lemma 3.2. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value, m be the number of tuples in
D and N be the number of tuples in D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] − di . Assuming that there are
enough number of tuples that can be used for the suppression process (i.e. no need for
executing DECP), the upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified
by the INCP algorithm is equal to m−N − 1− |Snbg |.
Proof: The INCP algorithm modifies the tuples d ∈ D[¬ α1 [d] = α1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧
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¬ αj−1 [d] = αj−1 [di ] ∧ αj [d] = v ∧ ¬ αj+1 [d] = αj+1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ αn [d] = αn [di ]]
for each v ∈ Snbg . In the worst case, Snbg contains all possible values of attribute αj
except αj [di ]. This implies
∑
v∈Snbg |D[αj [d] = v]| = m−N − 1. Moreover, due to the
definition of next best guess set and random next best guess the probability p(v|di) for
each v ∈ Snbg must be greater than zero. This implies that, in the worst case there exists
at least one tuple which has the same data values with di (except αj ) for each v ∈ Snbg .
So, we can conclude that the INCP algorithm can replace at most m−N − 1− |Snbg |
data values with ν for suppressing a confidential data value ¤
Example 3. Now, let us illustrate how the INCP algorithm suppresses Bob’s confi-
dential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model is constructed to find the
probabilities p(v|di) for all v ∈ V αj = {dyspepsia, angina pectoris, gastritis}. The Na-
ı¨ve Bayesian classification model constructed using the medical records of Table 1.2 is
shown in Table 3.1. According to the model the probabilities are p(dyspepsia|d2 ) = 0,
p(angina pectoris|d2 ) =
1
6
, and p(gastritis|d2 ) =
1
18
.
Step 2. The probability p(angina pectoris|d2 ) is greater than both p(dyspepsia|d2 ) and
p(gastritis|d2 ). As Bob’s diagnosis can be correctly predicted, the suppression process
starts.
Step 3. Let’s assume that gastritis is selected as the random next best guess. From
this point on, the INCP algorithm will try to increase p(gastritis|d2 ) above p(an-
ginapectoris|d2 ).
Step 4. All tuples d which has no common symptoms with Bob amongD[diagnosis[d] =
gastritis] is found. Tuple 4 satisfies the mentioned constraint.
Step 5. The diagnosis attribute is hidden from tuple 4. After this replacement,
p(gastritis|d2 ) increases to
1
7
, and p(angina pectoris|d2 ) increases to
4
21
. As p(angina
pectoris|d2 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d2 ), the suppression process continues.
Step 6. Since there are no more tuples which has no common symptoms with Bob
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Table 3.3: Academic Health Medical Records After INCP Execution
Zipcode Gender Age Indigestion Chest Palpitation Diagnosis
Pain
90302 Female 29 Y N Y Dyspepsia
90410 Male 22 N Y Y ?
90301 Male 27 Y N N Dyspepsia
90310 Female 43 Y N N ?
90301 Male 52 N Y Y Gastritis
90410 Male 47 Y Y Y Angina Pectoris
90305 Female 30 ? N Y Angina Pectoris
90402 Male 36 N Y Y Angina Pectoris
90301 Male 52 Y Y Y Gastritis
among D[diagnosis[d] = gastritis], the suppression process continues with the DECP
execution.
Step 7. To select the maximum impact attribute, the counts for each symptom attribute
is found as follows;
• countI = |D[diagnosis[d] = diagnosis[d2 ] ∧ indigestion[d] = indigestion[d2 ]]| = 2
• countCP = |D[diagnosis[d] = diagnosis[d2 ] ∧ chestpain[d] = chestpain[d2 ]]| = 2
• countP = |D[diagnosis[d] = diagnosis[d2 ] ∧ palpitation[d] = palpitation[d2 ]]| = 3
Both indigestion and chest pain attributes have the minimum count. Therefore, they
are the candidates for the maximum impact attribute. Let’s assume that indigestion is
selected as the maximum impact attribute.
Step 8. All tuples d satisfying the constraint indigestion [d] = N ∧ diagnosis[d] =
angina pectoris are found. Tuples 7 and 8 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 9. The indigestion attribute is hidden from tuple 7. With this replacement
p(angina pectoris|d2 ) decreases by
1
2
to 2
21
. As p(angina pectoris|d2 ) is smaller than
p(gastritis|d2 ), the suppression process stops. The resulting microdata can be seen in
Table 3.3.
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3.1.3 DROPP Algorithm
The DROPP algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ], so that it
cannot be correctly predicted by the classification model ςnb
D−d i ,αj . It aims at dropping
the probability p(αj [di ]|di) below that of the random next best guess vrnbg , so that it
cannot be correctly predicted by the classification model ςnb
D−d i ,αj . Unlike DECP
and INCP algorithms, it achieves its goal by downgrading the tuple di , instead of
downgrading classification model ςnb
D−d i ,αj .
The algorithm employs the following modified definition of Maximum Impact At-
tribute.
Definition 3.6. Maximum Impact Attribute. The attribute with maximum impact
on p(αj [di ]|di), denoted by αMI
αj [d i ], is the one that satisfies the following conditions.
αMI
αj [d i ] = argmax α∈Λ
(
|D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ α[d] = α[di ]]− di |
|D[αj [d] = vrnbg ∧ α[d] = α[di ]]|
)
∧ p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ]) > p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|vrnbg) (3.9)
Definition 3.7. Maximum Impact Data Value. The maximum impact data value
is the instance of maximum impact data attribute αMI
αj [d i ] in tuple di .
It must be noted that, the maximum impact data values have a higher probability of
occurrence in tuples d ∈ D[αj [d] = αj [di ]]− di than that of tuples d ∈ D[αj [d] = vrnbg ].
Therefore, they are the key to decrease p(αj [di ]|di) below p(vrnbg |di).
In each iteration, the DROPP algorithm identifies αMI
αj [d i ] and modifies the tuple
di by replacing αMI
αj [d i ][di ] with ν until the goal is achieved, that is until p(αj [di ]|di)
becomes less than p(vrnbg |di). Each such replacement results in the maximum possible
reduction in
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
, thus requiring less number of modifications.
Theorem 3.2. Let αMI
αj [d i ] be the maximum impact attribute satisfying Equation (3.9).
Then, every replacement of a maximum impact data value with ν causes the maximum
decrease in
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
, thus resulting in fewer data values to be modified.
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Proof: Let us first find the effect of replacing a maximum impact data value with ν on
p(αj [di ]|di) and p(vrnbg |di) . Remember that, since p(di) is same for all v ∈ V αj , it can
be ignored when calculating p(αj [di ]|di).
p(αj [di ]|di) =
p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
p(di)
∼= p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
∼= p(αj [di ])p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ])
×
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
Similarly,
p(vrnbg |di) =
p(vrnbg)p(di |vrnbg)
p(di)
∼= p(vrnbg)p(di |vrnbg)
∼= p(vrnbg)p(αMI
vrnbg [di ]|vrnbg)
×
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMI vrnbg}p(α[di ]|vrnbg)
Let the size of the microdata set D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d] = αMI
αj [d i ][di ]]− di be
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ] and the size of the microdata set D[αj [d] = αj [di ]]−di be Fαj [d i ]. Let the
size of the microdata set D[αj [d] = vrnbg ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d] = αMI
αj [d i ][di ]] be F vrnbg ,αMIαj [di ]
and the size of the microdata set D[αj [d] = vrnbg ] be F vrnbg . Replacement of the
maximum impact data value causes
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
to decrease by
F vrnbg
Fαj [di ]
×
F
αj [di ],αMI
αj [di ]
F
vrnbg ,αMI
αj [di ]
as
shown below.
p′(αj [di ]|di) ∼= p
′(αj [di ])p
′(di |αj [di ])
∼= p(αj [di ])
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
∼= p(αj [di ]|di)
Fαj [d i ]
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
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p′(vrnbg |di) ∼= p
′(vrnbg)p
′(di |vrnbg)
∼= p(vrnbg)
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|vrnbg)
∼= p(vrnbg |di)
F vrnbg
F
vrnbg ,αMI
αj [di ]
p′(αj [di ]|di)
p′(vrnbg |di)
=
p(αj [di ]|di)
Fαj [di ]
F
αj [di ],αMI
αj [di ]
p(vrnbg |di)
F vrnbg
F
vrnbg ,αMI
αj [di ]
=
p(αj [di ]|di)
p(vrnbg |di)
Fαj [d i ]
F vrnbg
F
vrnbg ,αMI
αj [di ]
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
p′(αj [di ]|di )
p′(vrnbg |di )
=
F vrnbg
Fαj [d i ]
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
F
vrnbg ,αMI
αj [di ]
Now let us assume that there is another attribute αk which decreases
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
more
than that of αMI
αj [d i ]. This implies the following:
F vrnbg
Fαj [d i ]
Fαj [d i ],αk
F vrnbg ,αk
>
F vrnbg
Fαj [d i ]
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
F
vrnbg ,αMI
αj [di ]
Fαj [d i ],αk
F vrnbg ,αk
>
F
αj [d i ],αMI
αj [di ]
F
vrnbg ,αMI
αj [di ]
However, this contradicts the definition of Maximum Impact Attribute. So, we can
conclude that every replacement of a maximum impact data value with ν causes the
highest decrease in
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
which in turn implies that the number of data values that
should be modified is minimal¤
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the
algorithm verifies the need for suppression. It finds p(v|di) for all v ∈ V αj and checks
the truth value of Assertion (3.8). If Assertion (3.8) is true, it picks a random next best
guess vrnbg from V αj . Next, in each iteration it finds the maximum impact attribute
αMI
αj [d i ] and replaces the maximum impact data value αMI
αj [d i ][di ] by ν. After each
iteration, it re-checks the truth value of Assertion (3.8) to decide whether to continue
execution. If Assertion (3.8) is still true after all possible maximum impact attributes
are processed, it reverts all changes and deletes the tuple di from the microdata set.
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
Find probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V αj
If p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ] {
If |V αj | = 2
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg among Ωk
αj [d i ]
While p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(vrnbg |di ) and candidates for maximum impact attribute exist {
Find the maximum impact attribute αMI
αj [d i ]
Replace the maximum impact data value αMI
αj [d i ][di ] with ν
Recalculate probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V αj
}
If p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ] {
Revert all changes
Delete microdata tuple di
}
Else
Replace αj [di ] with ν
}
END
ATTRIBUTE FindMaximumImpactAttributeForDROPP(D,di ,αj ,vrnbg ) {
ratio = 0
countαj [d i ] = number of all tuples d ∈ D − di satisfying the constraint αj [d] = αj [di ]
countvrnbg = number of all tuples d ∈ D satisfying the constraint αj [d] = vrnbg
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj {
countα
αj [d i ] = number of all tuples d ∈ D − di satisfying the constraint
αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ α[d] = α[di ]
countα
vrnbg = number of all tuples d ∈ D satisfying the constraint αj [d] = vrnbg ∧ α[d] = α[di ]
p(α[di ]|αj [di ]) =
countα
αj [di ]
countαj [di ]
, p(α[di ]|vrnbg ) =
countα
vrnbg
countvrnbg
If countα
αj [d i ]/countα
vrnbg > ratio and p(α[di ]|αj [di ]) > p(α[di ]|vrnbg ){
ratio = countα
αj [d i ]/countα
vrnbg
αMI
αj [d i ] = α
}
}
return αMI
αj [d i ]
}
Figure 3.4: Pseudocode of DROPP Algorithm
An overview of the algorithm is provided in Figure 3.4.
Lemma 3.3. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value and n be the number of attributes.
Then, the upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified by the DROPP
algorithm is equal to n− 1.
Proof: The DROPP algorithm modifies only tuple di which has n − 1 data values
excluding the confidential data value. So, we can conclude that the DROPP algorithm
can replace at most n− 1 data values with ν for suppressing a confidential data value
¤
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Example 4. Now, let us illustrate how the DROPP algorithm suppresses Bob’s confi-
dential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model is constructed to find the
probabilities p(v|di) for all v ∈ V αj = {dyspepsia, angina pectoris, gastritis}. The Na-
ı¨ve Bayesian classification model constructed using the medical records of Table 1.2 is
shown in Table 3.1. According to the model the probabilities are p(dyspepsia|d2 ) = 0,
p(angina pectoris|d2 ) =
1
6
, and p(gastritis|d2 ) =
1
18
.
Step 2. The probability p(angina pectoris|d2 ) is greater than both p(dyspepsia|d2 ) and
p(gastritis|d2 ). As Bob’s diagnosis can be correctly predicted, the suppression process
starts.
Step 3. Let’s assume that gastritis is selected as the random next best guess. From
this point on, the DROPP algorithm will try to drop p(angina pectoris|d2 ) below
p(gastritis|d2 ).
Step 4. To select the maximum impact attribute, the following counts and ratios are
found;
• countI
AP = |D[diagnosis[d] = angina pectoris∧indigestion[d] = indigestion[d2 ]]| = 2
• countI
G = |D[diagnosis[d] = gastritis∧ indigestion[d] = indigestion[d2 ]]| = 1
• countCP
AP = |D[diagnosis[d] = angina pectoris∧ chest pain[d] = chest pain[d2 ]]| = 2
• countCP
G = |D[diagnosis[d] = gastritis∧ chest pain[d] = chest pain[d2 ]]| = 2
• countP
AP = |D[diagnosis[d] = angina pectoris∧ palpitation[d] = palpitation[d2 ]]| = 3
• countP
G = |D[diagnosis[d] = gastritis∧ palpitation[d] = palpitation[d2 ]]| = 2
• ratioI = 2
• ratioCP = 1
• ratioP = 3/2
37
Table 3.4: Academic Health Medical Records After DROPP Execution
Zipcode Gender Age Indigestion Chest Pain Palpitation Diagnosis
90302 Female 29 Y N Y Dyspepsia
90410 Male 22 ? Y ? ?
90301 Male 27 Y N N Dyspepsia
90310 Female 43 Y N N Gastritis
90301 Male 52 N Y Y Gastritis
90410 Male 47 Y Y Y Angina Pectoris
90305 Female 30 N N Y Angina Pectoris
90402 Male 36 N Y Y Angina Pectoris
90301 Male 52 Y Y Y Gastritis
Indigestion has the maximum ratio. Therefore, it is selected as the maximum impact
attribute.
Step 5. The indigestion attribute is hidden from tuple 2. With this replacement
p(angina pectoris|d2 ) increases to
1
4
, and p(gastritis|d2 ) increases to
1
6
. As p(angina
pectoris|d2 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d2 ), the suppression process continues with
the next maximum impact attribute which is palpitation.
Step 6. The palpitation attribute is hidden from tuple 2. With this replacement
p(angina pectoris|d2 ) remains the same, but p(gastritis|d2 ) increases to
1
4
. As p(angina
pectoris|d2 ) is equal to p(gastritis|d2 ), the suppression process stops. The resulting
microdata set can be seen in Table 3.4.
3.2 Suppression Against Decision Tree Classifica-
tion Models
In the following, we present the HID3 algorithm for preventing decision tree classifica-
tion based inference using deletion. Although we have used ID3 in our experiments, the
proposed algorithm can be used to suppress a confidential data value from any decision
tree algorithm.
38
3.2.1 HID3 Algorithm
The HID3 algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ], so that the
ID3 classifier ς id3
D−d i ,αj cannot correctly predict its actual value. Similar to the DROPP
algorithm, it achieves its goal by downgrading the microdata tuple di containing the
confidential data value.
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the
algorithm builds the decision tree using D − di and verifies the need for suppression.
If ς id3
D−d i ,αj can correctly predict the confidential data value, it calls the recursive
ID3Hide function. Then, the ID3Hide function checks whether the root node is a
leaf or not. If it is a leaf and its value is different from the confidential data value
αj [di ] it returns true, which in turn terminates the recursive function successfully. Or
else, it returns false. If the root node is not a leaf, then it finds the most probable
value vpi ∈ V αj for αj [di ], and checks whether vpi is equal to αj [di ] or not. If the most
probable value vpi is not equal to the actual confidential data value αj [di ] it returns true.
Otherwise, it further explores the child nodes of the root in order to suppress αj [di ].
Let the decision attribute of the root node be αroot , the most common child of the root
(i.e. the child with highest training population) be childMC and the child containing
αroot [di ] be childMatch . If αroot [di ] = ν or childMatch = childMC it tries to suppress the
confidential data value using childMC . Or else, it uses childMatch for suppression. After
exploring all possible sub-branches, if the algorithm fails to suppress the confidential
data value, it reverts all changes and deletes the tuple di from the microdata set. An
overview of the algorithm is provided in Figure 3.5.
If |V αj | = 2 is true, then suppressing the confidential data value might result in
an adversary guessing it correctly with 100% confidence. Therefore, the decision to
suppress a confidential data value is randomized for the case where |V αj | = 2. This
results in an adversary guessing the actual confidential data value with 50% confidence
which is the maximum uncertainty that can be achieved under such circumstances.
Lemma 3.4. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value and n be the number of attributes.
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
Replace the confidential data value αj [di ] with ν
Build the decision tree using ID3
If vpi = αj [di ] {
If |V αj | = 2
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
If ID3Hide(root of the decision tree) == false
Delete microdata tuple di
}
END
BOOL ID3Hide(root) {
If root is a leaf return root.value 6= αj [di ]
If vpi 6= αj [di ] return true
αroot = decision attribute of the root
childMC = most common child of the root
childMatch = child containing the value αroot [di ]
If αroot [di ] = ν return ID3Hide(childMC )
Else If childMC = childMatch {
Replace αroot [di ] with ν
If ID3Hide(childMC ) return true
Else {
Revert changes to αroot [di ]
return false
}
}
Else If ID3Hide(childMatch ) return true
Else {
Replace αroot [di ] with ν
If ID3Hide(childMC ) return true
Else {
Revert changes to αroot [di ]
return false
}
}
Figure 3.5: Pseudocode of HID3 Algorithm
Then, the upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified by the HID3
algorithm is equal to n− 1.
Proof: The HID3 algorithm modifies only tuple di which has n−1 data values excluding
the confidential data value. So, we can conclude that the HID3 algorithm can replace
at most n− 1 data values with ν for suppressing a confidential data value ¤
Example 5. For this specific example, let us assume Bob does not have any chest pain
and illustrate how the HID3 algorithm suppresses his confidential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the ID3 classification model shown in Figure 5 is constructed based
on the medical records shown in Table 1.2.
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Indigestion
Y N
Chest Pain
Y N
Node 1
Category % n
Angina Pectoris 37,5 3
Dyspepsia 25,0 2
Gastritis 37,5 3
Total 100,0 8
Node 3
Category % n
Angina Pectoris 25,0 1
Dyspepsia 50,0 2
Gastritis 25,0 1
Total 50,0 4
Node 2
Category % n
Angina Pectoris 50,0 2
Dyspepsia 0,0 0
Gastritis 50,0 2
Total 50,0 4
Node 5
Category % n
Angina Pectoris 100,0 1
Dyspepsia 0,0 0
Gastritis 0,0 0
Total 12,5 1
Node 4
Category % n
Angina Pectoris 0,0 0
Dyspepsia 66,7 2
Gastritis 33,3 1
Total 37,5 3
Palpitation
Y N
Node 7
Category % n
Angina Pectoris 0,0 0
Dyspepsia 50,0 1
Gastritis 50,0 1
Total 25,0 1
Node 6
Category % n
Angina Pectoris 0,0 0
Dyspepsia 100,0 1
Gastritis 0,0 0
Total 12,5 1
Figure 3.6: Decision Tree Constructed Using the Medical Records Shown in Table 1.2
Step 2. Starting from the root=node 1, the ID3Hide function checks whether it is
possible to correctly predict Bob’s diagnosis. Since Bob’s diagnosis can be correctly
predicted using the path chest pain = N ∧ indigestion = N , the suppression process
starts.
Step 3. Using the whole microdata the ID3Hide function checks whether the majority
of the tuples have chest pain = N . Since, the number of tuples having chest pain = N
is equal to the number of tuples having chest pain = Y , the function calls itself with
root=node 3.
Step 4. Starting from the subtree root=node 3, the ID3Hide function checks whether it
is possible to correctly predict Bob’s diagnosis. Since Bob’s diagnosis can be correctly
predicted using the path indigestion = N , the suppression process continues.
Step 5. Using only the tuples with chest pain = N , the ID3Hide function checks
whether the majority of the tuples have indigestion = N . Since, the number of tuples
having indigestion = N is smaller than the number of tuples having indigestion = Y ,
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Table 3.5: Academic Health Medical Records After HID3 Execution
Zipcode Gender Age Indigestion Chest Pain Palpitation Diagnosis
90302 Female 29 Y N Y Dyspepsia
90410 Male 22 ? Y Y ?
90301 Male 27 Y N N Dyspepsia
90310 Female 43 Y N N Gastritis
90301 Male 52 N Y Y Gastritis
90410 Male 47 Y Y Y Angina Pectoris
90305 Female 30 N N Y Angina Pectoris
90402 Male 36 N Y Y Angina Pectoris
90301 Male 52 Y Y Y Gastritis
the function calls itself with root=node 5.
Step 6. As node 5 is a leaf, the ID3Hide function checks whether the most probable
value, i.e. angina pectoris, and the confidential diagnosis are equal or not. As they are
equal, the function returns from the recursive call signaling an unsuccessful run.
Step 7. As the recursive call to ID3Hide was unsuccessful, the current node’s attribute,
i.e. the indigestion attribute, is hidden from Bob’s tuple. Next, the function calls itself
with root=node 4, as tuples with indigestion = Y constitute the majority among tuples
with chest pain = N .
Step 8. Starting from the subtree root=node 4, the ID3Hide function checks whether
it is possible to correctly predict Bob’s diagnosis. Since Bob’s diagnosis cannot be
correctly predicted using the path palpitation = Y , the suppression process stops. The
resulting microdata set can be seen in Table 3.5.
3.3 Suppression of Multiple Confidential Data Val-
ues
In the following, we present the enhanced versions of DECP and DROPP algorithms
for preventing probabilistic classification based inference. The proposed algorithms aim
to reduce to side-effects while suppressing multiple confidential data values.
3.3.1 e-DECP Algorithm
The enhanced DECP algorithm aims at suppressing multiple confidential data values
so that none of them can be correctly predicted by the downgraded classification model
ςnb
D ′,αj . The proposed algorithm reduces the side-effects of the original DECP algo-
rithm when (1) all confidential data values belong to a single attribute, and (2) all
confidential data values have the same value.
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj be the confidential attribute, S ⊂ D be the
set of tuples for which αj , satisfying the constraint αj [d] = conf value for all d ∈ S,is
confidential. As the first step, the algorithm replaces all confidential data values with
ν. Then, it identifies the candidate maximum impact data values, and initializes their
primary and secondary impacts. The primary impact is the number of tuples which
will be affected (i.e. the probabilities will be affected) if an instance of the maximum
impact data value is replaced with ν. The secondary impact, on the other hand is the
number of tuples that support both the confidential data value (i.e. αj = conf value)
and maximum impact data value. Next, for each tuple d ∈ S, the need for suppression
is verified by finding p(v|d) for all v ∈ V αj and checking the truth value of the following
assertion:
p(αj [d]|d) > p(v|d)|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [d] (3.10)
If Assertion (3.10) is true for a tuple d ∈ S, it picks a random next best guess vrnbg
d ,
from V αj . Next, the candidate maximum impact data values are sorted. Different from
the original DECP, which uses only the secondary impact to determine which maximum
impact data value to use, e-DECP also uses the primary impact in order to guarantee
suppression of maximum number of confidential data values with a single iteration.
With maximum impact values sorted, the rest of the execution is quite similar to the
original DECP which involves replacement of maximum impact data value instances,
re-calculation of probabilities and re-checking of Assertion (3.10). An overview of the
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data values
S, the set of tuples for which αj is confidential
conf value, the value of confidential attribute αj ∈ S
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
For each tuple d ∈ S
Replace the confidential data value of d with ν
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj {
For each possible value of vα ∈ V α {
Create the maximum impact data value candidate MIV [α][vα]
Set MIV [α][vα].primary impact to 0
Set MIV [α][vα].secondary impact to |D[αj [d] = conf value ∧ α[d] = vα]|
}
For each tuple d ∈ S {
Find probabilities p(v|d) for all v ∈ V αj
If Not (p(αj [d]|d) > p(v|d)|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [d]) Remove d from S
Else If |V αj | = 2
Randomly decide whether to suppress the confidential data value and remove d from S
if decision = ‘not suppress’
If d ∈ S {
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg
d among Ωk
αj [d]
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj
Increment MIV [α][α[d]].primary impact by 1
}
}
Sort MIV first by primary impact in descending order, then by secondary impact in ascending order
For each maximum impact value miv ∈MIV {
While |S| > 0 and miv.secondary impact > 1 {
Replace the next instance of miv with ν
miv.secondary impact−−
For each tuple d ∈ S {
Update p(αj [d]|d)
If p(αj [d]|d) ≤ p(vrnbg
d |d) Remove d from S
}
}
If |S| = 0 break
}
END
Figure 3.7: Pseudocode of e-DECP Algorithm
algorithm is provided in Figure 3.7.
3.3.2 e-DROPP Algorithm
The enhanced DROPP algorithm aims at suppressing multiple confidential data values
so that none of them can be correctly predicted by the corresponding classification
models ςnb
D ,α. The proposed algorithm reduces the side-effects of the original DROPP
algorithm when all confidential data values belong to a single tuple.
The algorithm works as follows: Let di be the tuple containing all confidential data
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values, and S be the set of attributes containing a confidential data value in di . As
the first step, the algorithm verifies the need for suppression for each confidential data
value. More specifically, for each α ∈ S, it finds p(v|di) where v ∈ V α and checks the
truth value of the following assertion:
p(α[di ]|di) > p(v|di)|∀v ∈ V α − α[di ] (3.11)
If Assertion (3.11) is true, it picks a random next best guess vrnbg
vα from V α. Next,
it identifies the candidate maximum impact data values, and initializes their impacts
on each confidential value. To identify the maximum impact data value in each it-
eration, the impacts of candidates are averaged and sorted. With maximum impact
values sorted, the rest of the execution is quite similar to the original DROPP which
involves replacement of maximum impact data value instances from di , re-calculation
of probabilities and re-checking of Assertion (3.11). An overview of the algorithm is
provided in Figure 3.8.
3.4 Discussion on the Effectiveness of Proposed Al-
gorithms
The motivation of the suppression algorithms presented in this section is to make a
given set of confidential data values non-discoverable, while minimizing the effect on
the usefulness of the data for purposes other than predicting the confidential data
values. But how can we make sure that an adversary would not be able to predict the
suppressed confidential data values? Certainly this might be a problem if randomization
is not employed in various stages of the algorithms. Let us assume that an adversary
knows not only D′, the transformed microdata set, but also V αj , the domain of the
confidential data value αj [di ], and analyze how randomization avoids prediction of the
actual confidential data value. First, let us assume that a modified version of DECP
is used in order to suppress the confidential data value αj [di ]. This version of DECP
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
di , the tuple containing the confidential data values
S, the set of attributes containing a confidential data value in di
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
For each attribute α ∈ S {
Replace the confidential data value in α[di ] with ν
Find probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V α
If Not p(α[di ]|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V αj − αj [di ] Remove α from S
Else If |V α| = 2
Randomly decide whether to suppress the confidential data value and remove α from S
if decision = ‘not suppress’
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg
α among Ωk
α[d i ]
For each non confidential attribute α′
If α′[di ]! = ν {
Create the maximum impact data value candidate MIV [α][α′]
Set MIV [α′][α].αMI to α
′
Set MIV [α′][α].impact to
|D[α[d]=α[di ]∧α′[d]=α′[di ]]−di |
|D[α[d]=vrnbg∧α′[d]=α′[di ]]|
}
}
For each non confidential attribute α′
Find average impact MIV [α′].average impact
Sort maximum impact attributes by average impact in descending order
For each maximum impact value miv ∈MIV {
Replace the maximum impact data value miv.αMI [di ] with ν
For each confidential attribute α ∈ S {
Update the probabilities
If p(α[di ]|di ) ≤ p(vrnbg
α|di ) Remove α from S
}
If |S| = 0 break
}
END
Figure 3.8: Pseudocode of e-DROPP Algorithm
aims at decreasing p(αj [di ]|di) below that of the next best guess vnbg instead of vrnbg .
Definition 4.1. Next Best Guess. The next best guess, vnbg ∈ V αj , is a randomly
selected value from V αj satisfying the following conditions.
i. It is different from αj [di ],
vnbg 6= αj [di ] (3.12)
ii. It is among the top-2 probable set,
vnbg ∈ Ω2
αj [d i ] (3.13)
iii. The probability of αj
th attribute of di being equal to vnbg is smaller than that of
confidential data value αj [di ] and greater than zero.
p(αj [di ]|di) > p(vnbg |di) > 0 (3.14)
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This leads to a change in the ordering of the top-2 probable set Ω2
αj [d i ] = {αj [di ], vnbg}.
Knowing this fact, an adversary can predict the actual confidential data value to be
the one with the second highest probability in Ω2
αj [d i ] with a confidence equal to the
success rate of the algorithm. That is to say, if the success rate of the algorithm is
100%, then the adversary can predict the actual confidential data value with 100%
confidence. This problem exists not only in DECP but also in INCP and DROPP
algorithms. Therefore, the random next best guess is employed during suppression in
order to reduce the confidence of an adversary predicting the actual confidential value
as shown below.
Confidence =
SuccessRate
k
(3.15)
The second issue, that is inherent in all suppression algorithms, occurs when |V αj | = 2.
Let us assume that the decision to suppress the confidential data value αj [di ] is not
randomized when |V αj | = 2. In this case, the algorithms will try to suppress the
confidential data value with the maximum possible success rate. Knowing this fact, an
adversary can predict the actual confidential data value to be the one with the second
highest probability in V αj with a confidence equal to the success rate of the algorithm.
In order to avoid such attacks, we randomly decide to suppress a confidential data value
for microdata sets with |V αj | = 2.
Another issue is the effectiveness of the suppression algorithms against different
classification models. Remember that two of the proposed algorithms, the DECP and
INCP algorithms, aim at downgrading the classification model by modifying D−di . In
the first method, the probability of resemblance of the tuple containing the confidential
data value to other tuples d ∈ D satisfying αj [d] = αj [di ] is reduced. And, in the latter
method the probability of resemblance of the tuple containing the confidential data
value to the tuples d ∈ D satisfying αj [d] 6= αj [di ] is increased. On the other hand,
the DROPP and HID3 algorithms aim at downgrading the microdata tuple containing
the confidential data value. Both methods find the attributes that enable correct pre-
diction of the actual confidential value and hide them from the tuple containing the
confidential data value. As a result, the probability of similarity of the tuple contain-
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ing the confidential data value to the other tuples d ∈ D satisfying αj [d] = αj [di ] is
reduced. Since all classification methods tend to find the target attribute value of a
tuple based on its resemblance to other tuples in the training data set, the proposed
suppression algorithms are expected to achieve their goal even when used with other
classification methods. In order to verify this, we measured the effectiveness of each
algorithm against both Na¨ıve Bayesian, ID3 and SVM classification. The results can
be found in Chapter 5.
The final issue that needs to be discussed is the side effects of the proposed algo-
rithms which is related to the number of attribute values hidden excluding the confiden-
tial data value. Remember that, for each suppression algorithm we derived an upper
bound for the number of attribute values that will be modified in the previous section.
According to these derivations we can conclude the following;
i. The upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified by
the INCP algorithm depends on m, the number of tuples in D,
ii. The upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified by
the DROPP and HID3 algorithms depends on n, the number of attributes
in D,
iii. The upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified by
the DECP algorithm depends on n∗m, the number of attributes in D times
the number of tuples in D,
Now, let us assume that m >> n. In this case, the worst case performance of the
DROPP and HID3 algorithms should be much better than the worst case performance
of the DECP and INCP algorithms with respect to the side effects. However, for data
sets satisfying n >> m, e.g. gene expression data, the worst case performance of the
INCP algorithm will outperform the DECP, DROPP and HID3 algorithms with respect
to the side effects. Note that the DECP algorithm will perform slightly worse than the
other algorithms, as in both cases either m or n loses its significance with respect to
the other term.
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Chapter 4
SUPPRESSING MICRODATA TO PREVENT
CLASSIFICATION BASED INFERENCE USING
GENERALIZATION
Besides deletion, as presented in Section 3, we have proposed four algorithms to suppress
a confidential data value using the generalization modification strategy. The proposed
algorithms aim at suppressing only one confidential data value at a time, against two
popular classifier types: probabilistic and decision tree classifiers, as shown in Figure
4.1. We select Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 as typical representatives of probabilistic and
decision tree classifiers respectively, and developed our heuristics accordingly. More-
over, we propose enhancement to two of the proposed algorithms to suppress multiple
confidential data values with fewer side effects.
4.1 Suppression Against Probabilistic Classification
Models
In the following, we first explain how we calculate the class conditional frequencies in
presence of taxonomies, then we present three suppression algorithms preventing prob-
abilistic classification based inference using generalization. The proposed algorithms
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Microdata Suppression Using Generalization
Against Probabilistic Classifiers
DECP-G INCP-G DROPP-G
Against Decision 
Tree Classifiers
HID3-G
Classification Model 
Downgrade
Microdata Tuple Downgrade
Figure 4.1: Taxonomy of Microdata Suppression Algorithms using Generalization Mod-
ification Technique
aim to suppress a confidential data value, such that it is no longer among the Top-1
Probable value set.
Definition 4.1. Top-k Probable. Let αj [di ] be confidential, and thus generalized by
λ levels using the taxomomy Tαj . The Na¨ıve Bayesian Classifier built using D[αj [d] =
Generalize(αj [di ], λ, Tαj ) ∨ Descendant(αj [d], Generalize(αj [di ], λ, Tαj )) − di as the
training data set will predict the Top-k Probable value set for αj [di ] as Ωk
αj [d i ] ⊆ V αj .
The Top-k Probable value set satisfies the following constraints.
i. It’s size is equal to k. ∣∣Ωkαj [d i ]∣∣ = k (4.1)
ii. Every ω ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] should be a descendant of generalized αj [di ].
Descendant(ω,Generalize(αj [di ], λ, Tαj )) (4.2)
iii. The probability of αj [di ] being equal to the least probable value in the Top-k Probable
value set is greater than the probability of αj [di ] being equal to the most probable value
among the remaining attribute values.
p(ω|di) > p(v|di) | ∀v ∈ V αj − Ωk
αj [d i ] ∧Descendant(v,Generalize(αj [di ], λ, Tαj ))
∧ ω ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] (4.3)
50
The proposed suppression algorithms aim at either reducing p(αj [di ]|di) below that of
an attribute selected randomly from the Top-k Probable value set, called the Random
Next Best Guess, or increasing the probability of a set of attributes selected from the
Top-k Probable value set, called the Next Best Guess Set, above p(αj [di ]|di).
Definition 4.2. Random Next Best Guess(RNBG). The random next best guess,
vrnbg ∈ V αj , is a randomly selected value from V αj satisfying the following conditions.
i. It is different from αj [di ].
vrnbg 6= αj [di ] (4.4)
ii. It is among the Top-k Probable value set.
vrnbg ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] (4.5)
iii. The probability of αj
th attribute of di being equal to vrnbg is smaller than that of
confidential data value αj [di ] and greater than zero.
p(αj [di ]|di) > p(vrnbg |di) > 0 (4.6)
Definition 4.3. Next Best Guess (NBG) Set. The next best guess set, Snbg ⊆
Ωk
αj [d i ], for microdata tuple di is the set of all attribute values v ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] − αj [di ]
satisfying the following condition.
Snbg =
{
v|v ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] − αj [di ] ∧ p(v|di) ≥ p(vrnbg |di)
}
(4.7)
4.1.1 Calculation of Class Conditional Frequency Counts
In order to calculate the class conditional frequency counts in presence of taxonomies, we
adopt the expectation maximization algorithm proposed by Zhang et al. [62]. Given an
attribute value taxonomy Tαi for attribute αi ∈ Λ, the proposed algorithm constructs
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INPUT: D, the training data set
Tαi , the taxonomy set attribute αi ∈ Λ
OUTPUT: CCFC(Tαi ), the class conditional frequency counts for αi ∈ Λ
BEGIN
For each node node ∈ Tαi {
Create the corresponding node in CCFC(Tαi )
CCFC(Tαi ).node.count=|D[αi = node.value]|
}
Starting from the leaves of CCFC(Tαi ) aggregate node.count upwards
Starting from the root of CCFC(Tαi ) propogate node.count downwards according to the
observed distribution among its children
Return CCFC(Tαi )
END
Figure 4.2: Calculation of Class Conditional Frequency Counts in Presence of a Tax-
onomy by Zhang et al.
a tree of class conditional frequency counts CCFC(Tαi) such that (i) there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the nodes of the taxonomy Tαi and the nodes of the
corresponding CCFC(Tαi ), (ii) the class conditional frequency count associated with
a non leaf node,i.e. non-primitive value, of CCFC(Tαi ) is equal to the sum of the class
conditional frequency counts associated with its direct descendants. When all the tuples
in the data set D are fully specified, i.e. all attribute values are primitive, construction
of CCFC(Tαi ) for each attribute αi ∈ Λ is straightforward. First, the class conditional
frequency counts associated with each of the primitive values of αi is identified from
the data set D. Then, identified class conditional frequency counts are used recursively
to compute the class conditional frequency counts associated with non-primitive values
of αi . When some of the data are partially specified, i.e. some attribute values are
already generalized, and therefore non-primitive, the two step approach illustrated in
Figure 4.2 is used to construct CCFC(Tαi ). First, an upward pass aggregating the
class conditional frequency counts based on the specified attribute values in the data
set is realized. Then, the counts associated with partially specified attribute values are
propagated down through the tree, augmenting the counts at lower levels according to
the distribution of values along the branches based on the subset of the data for which
the corresponding values are fully specified.
Example 6. Let us illustrate estimation of class conditional frequency counts using a
simple example. On the nausea symptom taxonomy shown in Figure 4.3-(a), we first
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Figure 4.3: Estimation of class conditional frequency counts.(a) Initial counts associ-
ated with each attribute value showing the number of positively labeled instances. (b)
Aggregation of counts upwards from each node to its ancestors. (c) Distribution of
counts of a partially specified attribute value downwards among descendant nodes. (d)
Updating the estimated frequency counts for all attribute values.
mark each attribute value with a count showing the total number of instances having
that specific value as their nausea symptom. Then, we aggregate the counts upwards
from each node to its ancestors. For example, in Figure 4.3-(b), the two counts 6 and
4 on primitive attribute values 1 and 2 add up to 10 as the count for Low. As we
already have 5 instances which have their nausea symptom specified as Low, the two
counts (5 and 10) aggregate towards the root. Next, we distribute the counts of a
generalized attribute values downwards according to the distributions of values among
their descendant nodes. For example, 5, the count of instances which have their nausea
symptom specified as Low, is propagated down as 3 and 2 to descendant nodes 1 and
2 (See Figure 4.3-(c) for values in parentheses). Finally, we update the estimated
frequency counts for all attribute values as shown in Figure 4.3-(d).
53
INPUT: D, the microdata set
T , the taxonomy set for each attribute
MaxLevel, the maximum depth among the taxonomy sets
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
vactual = αj [di ]
λαj = 1
While λαj <= FindMaxLevel(T, αj ) {
αj [di ] = Generalize(vactual , λαj , Tαj , k)
If success =DECP-G(D,T, vactual , di , αj , λαj ,MaxLevel) break
Increment λαj by 1
}
If not success Delete tuple di
END
BOOL DECP-G(D,T ,vactual ,di ,αj ,λαj ,MaxLevel,k) {
V candidate = all v ∈ V αj satisfying Generalize(v, λαj , Tαj ) = αj [di ]
Find probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V candidate
If p(vactual |di ) > p(v|di ) | ∀v ∈ V candidate {
If |V candidate | = 2 {
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
Return true
}
Select top-k from V candidate to form Ωk
αj [d i ]
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg among Ωk
αj [d i ]
λ = 1
While λ <= MaxLevel {
While p(vactual |di ) > p(vrnbg |di ) and candidates for maximum impact attribute exist {
Find maximum impact attribute αMI
αj [d i ] for current level λ
Find maximum impact data values
F 1 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧ αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, T )]|
F 2 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧Descendant(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d],
Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ, T ))]|
F 3 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧Descendant(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d],
Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, T )]|
generalizedMIDV = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ, T )
While p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(vrnbg |di ) and (count1 > 1 or λ > 1) {
Replace the next data value in maximum impact data values with generalizedMIDV
p(αj [di ]|di )∗ =
F 1+F 3−1
F 1+F 3
× F 2
F 2−1
Decrement F 1 and F 2 by 1
}
}
Increment λ by 1
}
}
If p(vactual |di ) > p(v|di ) | ∀v ∈ V candidate Revert all changes and return false
Return true
}
ATTRIBUTE FindMaximumImpactAttributeForDECP-G(D,T ,vactual ,di ,αj ,λ) {
ratio = |D|
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj {
F 1 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧ α[d] = Generalize(α[di ], λ− 1, Tα)]|
F 2 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧Descendant(α[d], Generalize(α[di ], λ, Tα))]|
F 3 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧Descendant(α[d], Generalize(α[di ], λ− 1, Tα)]|
ratio′ = F 1+F3−1
F 1+F 3
× F 2
F 2−1
If ratio′ < ratio and (F 1 > 1 or λ > 1) {
ratio = F 1+F 3−1
F 1+F 3
× F 2
F 2−1
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T = α
}
}
Return αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T
}
Figure 4.4: Pseudocode of DECP-G Algorithm
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4.1.2 DECP-G Algorithm
The DECP-G algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ] via gen-
eralization so that it cannot be correctly predicted by the downgraded classification
model ςnb
D ′−d i ,αj . It accomplishes its goal by decreasing the probability p(αj [di ]|di)
below that of the random next best guess vrnbg .
Definition 4.4. Maximum Impact Attribute for DECP-G. Let F 1 ,F 2 and F 3
denote the original frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraints respec-
tively α[d] = Generalize(α[di ], λ − 1, T ), Descendant(α[d], Generalize(α[di ], λ, T )) =
True, and Descendant(α[d], Generalize(α[di ], λ − 1, T )) = True among the dataset
D[αj [d] = αj [di ]]− di . The attribute with maximum impact on p(αj [di ]|di), when gen-
eralized by λ levels, denoted by αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T , is the one that satisfies the following con-
dition.
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T = argmin α∈Λ
(
F 1 + F 3 − 1
F 1 + F 3
×
F 2
F 2 − 1
)
(|D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ α[d] = Generalize (α[di ], λ− 1, Tα)]− di | > 1∨λ > 1)
(4.8)
Definition 4.5. Maximum Impact Data Values. The maximum impact data
values are the instances of αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T in tuples d ∈ D[αj [d] = αj [di ]∧αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] =
Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, Tα] excluding di .
In each iteration, the DECP-G algorithm (i) identifies the maximum impact at-
tribute αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T for the current generalization level λ, and (ii) modifies the tuples
d ∈ D[αj [d] = αj [di ]∧αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, Tα)]− di , by
generalizing αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] λ levels until the goal is achieved, that is until p(αj [di ]|di)
becomes less than p(vrnbg |di). Each such generalization results in the maximum possible
reduction in p(αj [di ]|di), thus requiring less number of generalizations.
Theorem 4.1. Let αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T be the maximum impact attribute for level λ satisfying
the equation (4.8). Then, every generalization of a maximum impact data value from
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level λ − 1 to λ causes the maximum decrease in p(αj [di ]|di), thus resulting in fewer
data values to be modified.
Proof: Let us first find the effect of generalizing a maximum impact data value on
p(αj [di ]) p(di |αj [di ]). Remember that, since p(di) is same for all v ∈ V αj , it can be
ignored when calculating p(αj [di ]|di).
p(αj [di ]|di) =
p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
p(di)
∼= p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
∼= p(αj [di ])p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ])
×
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
Let us assume that;
• F¯ 0 be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying αj [d] = αj [di ] among D
excluding di ,
• F¯ 1 be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraint;
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ, T )
among D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] excluding di ,
• F 1 be the original frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraint;
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, T )
among D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] excluding di ,
• F 2 be the original frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraint;
Descendant(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d], Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, T ))
among D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] excluding di ,
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• F 3 be the original frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraint;
Descendant(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d], Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, T ))
among D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] excluding di , and
• c be the difference between the updated frequency count F¯ 1 and F 1 + F 3 .
Single generalization of a maximum impact data value from level λ − 1 to λ causes
p(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ]|αj [di ]) to decrease from
1+
F1
F3
+c
F1+F3
F2F3
F¯ 0
to
1+
F1−1
F3
+(c+1)
F1+F3−1
(F2−1)F3
F¯ 0
. This,
in turn decreases p(di |αj [di ]) by
F 1+F 3−1
F 1+F 3
× F 2
F 2−1
as shown below.
p′(di |αj [di ]) =
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T}p
′(α[di ]|αj [di ])p
′(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ]|αj [di ])
=
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
1 + F 1−1
F 3
+ (c+ 1)F 1+F 3−1
(F 2−1)F 3
F¯ 0
=
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
F 1 + F 3 − 1
F 2 − 1
F 2 + c
F 3 F¯ 0
=
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
F 1 + F 3 − 1
F 2 − 1
F 2 + c
F 3 F¯ 0
×
1 + F 1
F 3
+ cF 1+F 3
F 2F 3
1 + F 1
F 3
+ cF 1+F 3
F 2F 3
=
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
F 1 + F 3 − 1
F 2 − 1
F 2 + c
F 3
×
p(αMI
αj [d i ][di ]|αj [di ])
1 + F 1
F 3
+ cF 1+F 3
F 2F 3
=
F 1 + F 3 − 1
F 2 − 1
F 2 + c
F 3
F 2
F 1 + F 3
F 3
F 2 + c
p(di |αj [di ])
=
F 1 + F 3 − 1
F 1 + F 3
F 2
F 2 − 1
p(di |αj [di ])
Let us assume that there is another attribute αk which decreases p(αj [di ]|di) more than
that of αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T . This implies the following;
F 1 ,αk + F 3 ,αk − 1
F 1 ,αk+F3 ,αk
F 2 ,αk
F 2 ,αk − 1
<
F
1 ,αMI
αj [di ],λ,T + F 3 ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T − 1
F
1 ,αMI
αj [di ],λ,T + F 3 ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T
F
2 ,αMI
αj [di ],λ,T
F
2 ,αMI
αj [di ],λ,T − 1
However, this contradicts the definition of Maximum Impact Attribute. Therefore, we
can conclude that every generalization of a maximum impact data value causes the
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highest decrease in p(αj [di ]|di) which in turn implies that the number of data values
that should be modified is minimal¤
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the
algorithm backs up the confidential data value αj [di ] as vactual , and generalizes it to
the next level. Then, it verifies the need for suppression. It first finds the candidate
set for the confidential data value, V candidate , which includes all v ∈ V αj satisfying
the constraint Generalize(v, levelαj , Tαj ) = αj [di ]. Then, it finds p(v|di) for all v ∈
V candidate and checks the truth value of the following assertion:
p(vactual |di) > p(v|di)|∀v ∈ V candidate (4.9)
If Assertion (4.11) is true, it picks a random next best guess vrnbg from V candidate and
sets the level of generalization to 1. Next, in each iteration it finds the maximum impact
attribute αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T for the current level λ and generalizes the maximum impact data
values by λ levels as long as p(αj [di ]|di) > p(vrnbg |di). After processing all maximum
impact attributes, it re-checks the truth value of Assertion (4.9). If Assertion (4.9) is
still true, then it increments the current level of generalization by 1 and repeats the
generalization process until there are no levels left for generalization. After processing
all levels and maximum impact attributes, it re-checks the truth value of Assertion (4.9).
If Assertion (4.9) is still true, then it reverts all changes, generalizes the confidential
value to the next level, and repeats the above steps until either the confidential data
value is successfully suppressed or there are no levels left to generalize the confidential
data value. Finally, if the algorithm is not successful, i.e. the confidential data value
cannot be suppressed, then tuple di is deleted from the microdata set. An overview of
the algorithm is provided in Figure 4.4.
If |V candidate | = 2 is true, then suppressing the confidential data value might result
in an adversary guessing it correctly with 100% confidence. Therefore, the decision to
suppress a confidential data value is randomized for the case where |V candidate | = 2. This
results in an adversary guessing the actual confidential data value with 50% confidence
which is the maximum uncertainty that can be achieved under such circumstances.
58
Table 4.1: Academic Health Medical Records to be Shared with Academic Research
Institute
Indigestion Chest Palpitation Nausea Burning Diagnosis
Pain
4 4 2 5 2 Dyspepsia
4 5 4 Mid-High 4 Dyspepsia
5 2 3 3 5 Dyspepsia
3 3 3 4 2 Dyspepsia
2 2 5 3 3 Dyspepsia
4 4 3 2 4 Dyspepsia
3 4 3 3 3 Gastritis
5 2 4 4 2 Gastritis
3 3 4 4 3 Gastritis
3 2 4 5 5 Gastritis
4 5 2 3 5 Gastritis
4 3 3 2 4 Gastritis
3 2 3 2 3 S.I. Ulcer
5 2 2 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 2 2 2 S.I. Ulcer
3 4 5 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 3 4 5 S.I. Ulcer
4 4 3 3 4 Dyspepsia
Lemma 4.1. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value, n be the number of attributes
and N be the number of tuples in D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] − di . Then, the upper bound for
the number of data values that can be modified by the DECP-G algorithm is equal to
(n− 1)(N − 1).
Proof: The DECP-G algorithm modifies the maximum impact data values from the
tuples d ∈ D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧ αMI
αj [d i ][d] = αMI
αj [d i ][di ]] − di . As D[αj [d] = αj [di ] ∧
αMI
αj [d i ][d] = αMI
αj [d i ][di ]] ⊆ D[αj [d] = αj [di ]], the number of tuples that can be
modified for each maximum impact attribute is bounded by N − 1. At each iteration,
the DECP-G algorithm picks a different maximum impact attribute and generalizes the
instances of this attribute. Since, there are n− 1 different alternatives for a maximum
impact attribute, we can conclude that the DECP-G algorithm can change at most
(n− 1)(N − 1) data values for suppressing a confidential data value ¤
Example 7. Table 4.1 shows a set of patient records to be disclosed to third parties for
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Table 4.2: Academic Health Medical Records to be Shared with Academic Research
Institute
Indigestion Chest Palpitation Nausea Burning Diagnosis
Pain
4 4 2 5 2 Dyspepsia
4 5 4 Mid-High 4 Dyspepsia
5 2 3 3 5 Dyspepsia
3 3 3 4 2 Dyspepsia
2 2 5 3 3 Dyspepsia
4 4 3 2 4 Dyspepsia
3 4 3 3 3 Gastritis
5 2 4 4 2 Gastritis
3 3 4 4 3 Gastritis
3 2 4 5 5 Gastritis
4 5 2 3 5 Gastritis
4 3 3 2 4 Gastritis
3 2 3 2 3 S.I. Ulcer
5 2 2 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 2 2 2 S.I. Ulcer
3 4 5 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 3 4 5 S.I. Ulcer
4 4 3 3 4 Gastric Disease
research purposes. The diagnosis of the last patient, i.e. d18 , is confidential. Therefore,
it is generalized one level up as shown in Table 4.2. Now, let us illustrate how the
DECP-G algorithm suppresses the confidential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the confidential diagnosis is generalized one level up as shown in Table
4.2.
Step 2. Next, the Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model is constructed to find the prob-
abilities p(v|di) for all v ∈ V candidate = {dyspepsia, gastritis}. The Na¨ıve Bayesian
classification model constructed using the medical records of Table 4.2 is shown in Ta-
ble 4.3. According to the model the probabilities are p(dyspepsia|d18 ) = 0, 0058, and
p(gastritis|d18 ) = 0, 0005.
Step 3. The probability p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is greater than p(gastritis|d18 ). As the con-
fidential diagnosis can be correctly predicted, the suppression process starts.
Step 4. Since the size of V candidate is equal to 2, it is randomly decided whether to
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Table 4.3: Na¨ıve Bayesian Classification Model Constructed During the Run of DECP-
G Algorithm
p(Symptom|Diagnosis)
Step Diagnosis p(Diagnosis) I CP P N B p(Diagnosis|d18 )
2 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 2/6 3/6 2, 5/6 2/6 0, 00579
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
8 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 2/6 3/6 5/18 2/6 0, 00386
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
10 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 1, 5/6 3/6 5/18 2/6 0, 00289
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
12 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 1, 5/6 3/6 5/18 1, 5/6 0, 00217
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
14 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 1, 5/6 2, 5/6 5/18 1, 5/6 0, 00181
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
15 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 1, 5/6 5/18 5/18 1, 5/6 0, 00121
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
17 Dyspepsia 6/12 4/9 1, 5/6 5/18 5/18 1, 5/6 0, 00107
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
18 Dyspepsia 6/12 2/6 1, 5/6 5/18 5/18 1, 5/6 0, 00080
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
21 Dyspepsia 6/12 2/6 2/9 5/18 5/18 1, 5/6 0, 00071
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
23 Dyspepsia 6/12 2/6 2/9 5/18 5/18 2/9 0, 00064
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
25 Dyspepsia 6/12 7, 5/24 2/9 5/18 5/18 2/9 0, 00060
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
26 Dyspepsia 6/12 5/18 2/9 5/18 5/18 2/9 0, 00053
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
28 Dyspepsia 6/12 5/18 2/9 1, 6/6 5/18 2/9 0, 00051
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
continue with the suppression or not. Let us assume that it has been decided to continue
with the suppression process.
Step 5. Let us assume that gastritis is selected as the random next best guess. From this
point on the DECP-G algorithm will decrease p(dyspepsia|d18 ) below p(gastritis|d18 ).
Step 6. To select the maximum impact attribute, the ratios for each symptom attribute
is found as shown in Table 4.4. The nausea symptom has the minimum ratio. Therefore,
it is selected as the maximum impact attribute.
Step 7. All tuples d satisfying the constraint nausea [d] = 3∧diagnosis[d] = dyspepsia
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Table 4.4: Ratios Calculated to Determine the Maximum Impact Attribute for DECP-G
Step Result Indigestion Chest Pain Palpitation Nausea Burning
6 F 1 3 2 3 2 2
F 2 4 3 5 4 3
F 3 0 0 0 0 0
6 Ratio 8/9 3/4 10/12 4/6 3/4
19 F 1 2 1 2 2 1
F 2 5 4 6 6 4
F 3 2 2 3 3 2
19 Ratio 15/16 8/9 24/25 24/25 8/9
is found. Tuples 3 and 5 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 8. The nause attribute of tuple 3 is generalized one level up. With this replacement
p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
4
6
to 0, 00386. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than
p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum impact
attribute which is chest pain.
Step 9. All tuples d satisfying the constraint chestpain[d] = 4 ∧ diagnosis[d] =
dyspepsia is found. Tuples 2 and 6 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 10. The chest pain attribute of tuple 2 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
3
4
to 0, 00289. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact attribute which is burning.
Step 11. All tuples d satisfying the constraint burning[d] = 4∧diagnosis[d] = dyspepsia
is found. Tuples 2 and 6 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 12. The burning attribute of tuple 2 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
3
4
to 0, 00217. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact attribute which is palpitation.
Step 13. All tuples d satisfying the constraint palpitation[d] = 3 ∧ diagnosis[d] =
dyspepsia is found. Tuples 3,4 and 6 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
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Step 14. The palpitation attribute of tuple 3 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
10
12
to 0, 00181. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact value.
Step 15. The palpitation attribute of tuple 4 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
4
6
to 0, 00121. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact attribute which is indigestion.
Step 16. All tuples d satisfying the constraint indigestion[d] = 4 ∧ diagnosis[d] =
dyspepsia is found. Tuples 1,2 and 6 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 17. The indigestion attribute of tuple 1 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
8
9
to 0, 00107. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact value.
Step 18. The indigestion attribute of tuple 2 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
3
4
to 0, 00080. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next level
λ = 2.
Step 19. To select the maximum impact attribute, the ratios for each symptom attribute
is found as shown in Table 4.4. The chest pain symptom has the minimum ratio.
Therefore, it is selected as the maximum impact attribute.
Step 20. All tuples d satisfying the constraint chestpain[d] = H ∧ diagnosis[d] =
dyspepsia is found. Tuple 1 satisfies the mentioned constraint.
Step 21. The chest pain attribute of tuple 1 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
8
9
to 0, 00071. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact attribute which is burning.
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Table 4.5: Academic Health Medical Records Shared with Academic Research Institute
after Execution of DECP-G
Indigestion Chest Palpitation Nausea Burning Diagnosis
Pain
Mid-High Mid-High 2 5 2 Dyspepsia
Mid-High 5 4 Mid-High Mid-High Dyspepsia
5 2 ? Mid-High 5 Dyspepsia
3 3 Mid-High 4 2 Dyspepsia
2 2 5 3 3 Dyspepsia
4 4 3 2 4 Dyspepsia
3 4 3 3 3 Gastritis
5 2 4 4 2 Gastritis
3 3 4 4 3 Gastritis
3 2 4 5 5 Gastritis
4 5 2 3 5 Gastritis
4 3 3 2 4 Gastritis
3 2 3 2 3 S.I. Ulcer
5 2 2 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 2 2 2 S.I. Ulcer
3 4 5 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 3 4 5 S.I. Ulcer
4 4 3 3 4 Gastric Disease
Step 22. All tuples d satisfying the constraint burning[d] = H ∧ diagnosis[d] =
dyspepsia is found. Tuple 2 satisfies the mentioned constraint.
Step 23. The burning attribute of tuple 2 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
8
9
to 0, 00064. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact attribute which is indigestion.
Step 24. All tuples d satisfying the constraint indigestion[d] = H ∧ diagnosis[d] =
dyspepsia is found. Tuples 1 and 2 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 25. The indigestion attribute of tuple 1 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
15
16
to 0, 00060. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact value.
Step 26. The indigestion attribute of tuple 2 is generalized one level up. With this
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replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
8
9
to 0, 00053. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still
greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process continues with the next maximum
impact attribute which is palpitation.
Step 27. All tuples d satisfying the constraint palpitation[d] = MH ∧ diagnosis[d] =
dyspepsia is found. Tuples 3 and 4 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 28. The palpitation attribute of tuple 3 is generalized one level up. With this
replacement p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases by
24
25
to 0, 00051. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is equal
to p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process stops.
The resulting microdata set can be seen in Table 4.5.
4.1.3 INCP-G Algorithm
The INCP-G algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ], so that
it cannot be correctly predicted by the downgraded classification model ςnb
D ′−d i ,αj . It
accomplishes its goal, as its name implies, by increasing the probabilities p(v|di) for all
v in the next best guess set,Snbg , above p(αj [di ] | di).
For each v ∈ Snbg , the INCP-G algorithm identifies the tuples d ∈ D[αj [d] = v]
having no common attribute value with di and modifies them by generalizing αj [d] in
order to increase p(v|di).
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the
algorithm verifies the need for suppression. It finds p(v|di) for all v ∈ V candidate and
checks the truth value of Assertion (4.9). If Assertion (4.9) is true, it picks a random
next best guess vrnbg from V candidate , forms Snbg by finding the attribute values v ∈
V candidate satisfying p(v|di) ≥ p(vrnbg |di), and sets the level of generalization to 1. Next,
for each v ∈ Snbg , the algorithm finds the tuples d ∈ D[¬ α1 [d] = α1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧
¬ αj−1 [d] = αj−1 [di ] ∧ αj [d] = v ∧ ¬ αj+1 [d] = αj+1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ αn [d] = αn [di ]] and
modifies them by generalizing αj [d] by λ levels until the goal is achieved, that is until
p(v|di) becomes less than or equal to p(αj [di ]|di). After processing all levels, it re-
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
T , the taxonomy set for each attribute
MaxLevel, the maximum depth among the taxonomy sets
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
vactual = αj [di ]
λαj = 1
While λαj <= FindMaxLevel(T, αj )
{
αj [di ] = Generalize(vactual , λαj , Tαj )
If success =INCP-G(D,T, vactual , di , αj , λαj ,MaxLevel, k)
break
Increment λαj by 1
}
If not success
Run algorithm DECP-G
END
BOOL INCP-G(D,T ,vactual ,di ,αj ,λαj ,MaxLevel,k)
{
V candidate = all v ∈ V αj satisfying Generalize(v, λαj , Tαj ) = αj [di ]
If p(vactual |di ) > p(v|di ) | ∀v ∈ V candidate
{
If |V candidate | = 2
{
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
Return true
}
Select top-k from V candidate to form Ωk
αj [d i ]
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg among Ωk
αj [d i ]
Snbg = All attribute values v ∈ Ωk
αj [d i ] satisfying p(v|di ) ≥ p(vrnbg |di )
λ = 1
While λ <= MaxLevel
{
For each v ∈ Snbg
{
While p(αj [di ]|di ) > p(v|di ) and D[αj [d] = Generalize(v, λ− 1, Tαj )] 6= empty
{
t = next tuple in D[αj [d] = Generalize(v, λ− 1, Tαj )]
If t ∩ di = empty
{
αj [t] = Generalize(v, λ, Tαj )
Recalculate probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V candidate
}
}
}
Increment λ by 1
}
}
If p(vactual |di ) > p(v|di ) | ∀v ∈ V candidate
{
Revert all changes
Return false
}
Return true
}
Figure 4.5: Pseudocode of INCP-G Algorithm
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checks the truth value of Assertion (4.9). If Assertion (4.9) is still true, then it reverts
all changes, generalizes the confidential data value to the next level, and repeats the
above steps until either the confidential data value is successfully suppressed or there
are no levels left to generalize the confidential data value. Finally, if the algorithm
is not successful, i.e. the confidential data value cannot be suppressed, then DECP-G
algorithm is executed to complete the suppression process. An overview of the algorithm
is provided in Figure 4.1.3.
Lemma 4.2. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value, m be the number of tuples in
D and N be the number of tuples in D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] − di . Assuming that there are
enough number of tuples that can be used for the suppression process (i.e. no need for
executing DECP), the upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified
by the INCP-G algorithm is equal to m−N − 1− |Snbg |.
Proof: The INCP-G algorithm modifies the tuples d ∈ D[¬ α1 [d] = α1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧
¬ αj−1 [d] = αj−1 [di ] ∧ αj [d] = v ∧ ¬ αj+1 [d] = αj+1 [di ] ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ αn [d] = αn [di ]]
for each v ∈ Snbg . In the worst case, Snbg contains all possible values of attribute αj
except αj [di ]. This implies
∑
v∈Snbg |D[αj [d] = v]| = m−N − 1. Moreover, due to the
definition of next best guess set and random next best guess the probability p(v|di)
for each v ∈ Snbg must be greater than zero. This implies that, in the worst case
there exists at least one tuple which has the same data values with di (except αj ) for
each v ∈ Snbg . So, we can conclude that the INCP algorithm can generalize at most
m−N − 1− |Snbg | data values for suppressing a confidential data value ¤
Example 8. Now, let us illustrate how the INCP-G algorithm suppresses the confi-
dential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the confidential diagnosis is generalized one level up as shown in Table
4.2.
Step 2. Next, the Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model is constructed to find the prob-
abilities p(v|di) for all v ∈ V candidate = {dyspepsia, gastritis}. The Na¨ıve Bayesian
classification model constructed using the medical records of Table 4.2 is shown in Ta-
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Table 4.6: Na¨ıve Bayesian Classification Model Constructed During the Run of INCP-G
Algorithm
p(Symptom|Diagnosis)
Step Diagnosis p(Diagnosis) I CP P N B p(Diagnosis|d18 )
2 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 2/6 3/6 2, 5/6 2/6 0, 00579
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
7 Dyspepsia 6, 5˜4/12 3/6, 5˜4 2/6, 5˜4 3/6, 5˜4 2, 5/6, 5˜4 2/6, 5˜4 0, 00409
Gastritis 5, 4˜5/12 2/5, 4˜5 1/5, 4˜5 2/5, 4˜5 2/5, 4˜5 1/5, 4˜5 0, 00075
8 Dyspepsia 7, 2/12 3/7, 2 2/7, 2 3/7, 2 2, 5/7, 2 2/7, 2 0, 00279
Gastritis 4, 8/12 2/4, 8 1/4, 8 2/4, 8 2/4, 8 1/4, 8 0, 00126
9 Dyspepsia 8/12 3/8 2/8 3/8 2, 5/8 2/8 0, 00183
Gastritis 4/12 2/4 1/4 2/4 2/4 1/4 0, 00260
ble 4.6. According to the model the probabilities are p(dyspepsia|d18 ) = 0, 0058, and
p(gastritis|d18 ) = 0, 0005.
Step 3. The probability p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is greater than p(gastritis|d18 ). As the con-
fidential diagnosis can be correctly predicted, the suppression process starts.
Step 4. Since the size of V candidate is equal to 2, it is randomly decided whether to
continue with the suppression or not. Let us assume that it has been decided to continue
with the suppression process.
Step 5. Let us assume that gastritis is selected as the random next best guess. From this
point on the INCP-G algorithm will increase p(gastritis|d18 ) above p(dyspepsia|d18 ).
Step 6. All tuples which has no common symptoms with d18 among D[diagnosis =
gastritis] is found. Tuples 8,9 and 10 satisfy the mentioned constraint.
Step 7. The diagnosis attribute of tuple 8 is generalized to Gastric Disease. After this
generalization, p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to 0, 00075, and p(dyspepsia|d18 ) decreases
to 0, 00409. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
process continues.
Step 8. The diagnosis attribute of tuple 9 is generalized to Gastric Disease. After this
generalization, p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to 0, 00126, and p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases
to 0, 00279. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
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Table 4.7: Academic Health Medical Records Shared with Academic Research Institute
after Execution of INCP-G
Indigestion Chest Palpitation Nausea Burning Diagnosis
Pain
4 4 2 5 2 Dyspepsia
4 5 4 Mid-High 4 Dyspepsia
5 2 3 3 5 Dyspepsia
3 3 3 4 2 Dyspepsia
2 2 5 3 3 Dyspepsia
4 4 3 2 4 Dyspepsia
3 4 3 3 3 Gastritis
5 2 4 4 2 Gastric Disease
3 3 4 4 3 Gastric Disease
3 2 4 5 5 Gastric Disease
4 5 2 3 5 Gastritis
4 3 3 2 4 Gastritis
3 2 3 2 3 S.I. Ulcer
5 2 2 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 2 2 2 S.I. Ulcer
3 4 5 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 3 4 5 S.I. Ulcer
4 4 3 3 4 Gastric Disease
process continues.
Step 9. The diagnosis attribute of tuple 10 is generalized to Gastric Disease. After this
generalization, p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to 0, 00260, and p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to
0, 00183. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is smaller than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process
stops.
The resulting microdata set can be seen in Table 4.7.
4.1.4 DROPP-G Algorithm
The DROPP-G algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ], so
that it cannot be correctly predicted by the classification model ςnb
D−d i ,αj . It aims at
dropping the probability p(αj [di ]|di) below that of the random next best guess vrnbg ,
so that it cannot be correctly predicted by the classification model ςnb
D−d i ,αj . Unlike
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
T , the taxonomy set for each attribute
MaxLevel, the maximum depth among the taxonomy sets
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
vactual = αj [di ]
λαj = 1
While λαj <= FindMaxLevel(T, αj ) {
αj [di ] = Generalize(vactual , λαj , Tαj )
If success =DROPP-G(D,T, vactual , di , αj , λαj ,MaxLevel, k)
break
Increment λαj by 1
}
If not success
Delete tuple di
END
BOOL DROPP-G(D,T ,vactual ,di ,αj ,λαj ,MaxLevel,k) {
V candidate = all v ∈ V αj satisfying Generalize(v, λαj , Tαj ) = αj [di ]
Find probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V candidate
If p(vactual |di ) > p(v|di ) | ∀v ∈ V candidate {
If |V candidate | = 2 {
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
Return true
}
Select top-k from V candidate to form Ωk
αj [d i ]
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg among Ωk
αj [d i ]
λ = 1
While λ <= MaxLevel {
While p(vactual |di ) > p(vrnbg |di ) and candidates for maximum impact attribute exist {
Find maximum impact attribute αMI
αj [d i ] for current level
αMI
αj [d i ][di ] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ][di ], λ, TαMI )
Recalculate probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V candidate
}
Increment λ by 1
}
}
If p(vactual |di ) > p(v|di ) | ∀v ∈ V candidate Revert all changes and return false
Return true
}
ATTRIBUTE FindMaximumImpactAttributeForDROPP-G(D,T ,vactual ,di ,αj ,vrnbg ,λ) {
ratio = 0
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj {
F¯α,vrnbg ,λ = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[αj [d] = vrnbg ∧ α[d] = Generalize(α[di ], λ, Tα)]
F¯α,vrnbg ,λ−1 = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[αj [d] = vrnbg ∧ α[d] = Generalize(α[di ], λ− 1, Tα)]
F¯α,vactual ,λ = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[αj [d] = vactual ∧ α[d] = Generalize(α[di ], λ, Tα)]
F¯α,vactual ,λ−1 = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[αj [d] = vactual ∧ α[d] = Generalize(α[di ], λ− 1, Tα)]
ratio′ =
F¯α,vrnbg ,λ
F¯α,vrnbg ,λ−1
×
F¯α,vactual ,λ−1
F¯α,vactual ,λ
If ratio′ > ratio {
ratio = ratio′
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T = α
}
}
Return αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T
}
Figure 4.6: Pseudocode of DROPP-G Algorithm
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DECP-G and INCP-G algorithms, it achieves its goal by downgrading the tuple di ,
instead of downgrading classification model ςnb
D−d i ,αj .
The algorithm employs the following modified definition of Maximum Impact At-
tribute.
Definition 4.6. Maximum Impact Attribute for DROPP-G. Let us assume that
F¯α,v ,λ denote the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraint
αj [d] = v ∧ α[d] = Generalize(α[di ], λ, T ). The attribute with maximum impact on
p(αj [di ]|di), denoted by αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T , is the one that satisfies the following condition.
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T = argmax α∈Λ
(
F¯α,vrnbg ,λ
F¯α,vrnbg ,λ−1
×
F¯α,αj [d i ],λ−1
F¯α,αj [d i ],λ
)
(4.10)
Definition 4.7. Maximum Impact Data Value. The maximum impact data value
is the instance of maximum impact data attribute αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T in tuple di .
In each iteration, the DROPP-G algorithm identifies αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T and modifies
the tuple di by generalizing αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ] until the goal is achieved, that is until
p(αj [di ]|di) becomes less than p(vrnbg |di). Each such replacement results in the maxi-
mum possible reduction in
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
, thus requiring less number of modifications.
Theorem 4.2. Let αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T be the maximum impact attribute satisfying Equation
(4.10). Then, generalization of the maximum impact data value causes the maximum
decrease in
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
, thus resulting in fewer data values to be modified.
Proof: Let us first find the effect of generalizing a maximum impact data value on
p(αj [di ]|di) and p(vrnbg |di) . Remember that, since p(di) is same for all v ∈ V αj , it can
be ignored when calculating p(αj [di ]|di).
p(αj [di ]|di) =
p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
p(di)
∼= p(αj [di ])p(di |αj [di ])
∼= p(αj [di ])p(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ]|αj [di ])
×
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
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Similarly,
p(vrnbg |di) =
p(vrnbg)p(di |vrnbg)
p(di)
∼= p(vrnbg)p(di |vrnbg)
∼= p(vrnbg)p(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ]|vrnbg)
×
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMIαj [di ],λ,T}p(α[di ]|vrnbg)
Let us assume that;
• F¯ vrnbg be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraint
D[αj [d] = vrnbg ] excluding di ,
• F¯αj [d i ] be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the following constraint
D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] excluding di ,
• F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ
be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the follow-
ing constraint;
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ, T )
among D[αj [d] = vrnbg ] excluding di ,
• F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ−1
be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the fol-
lowing constraint;
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, T )
among D[αj [d] = vrnbg ] excluding di ,
• F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ
be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the follow-
ing constraint;
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ, T )
among D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] excluding di , and
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• F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ−1
be the updated frequency count of tuples satisfying the fol-
lowing constraint;
αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [d] = Generalize(αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T [di ], λ− 1, T )
among D[αj [d] = αj [di ]] excluding di .
Replacement of the maximum impact data value causes
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
to change by
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [di ],λ
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [di ],λ−1
×
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ−1
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ
as shown below.
p′(αj [di ]|di) ∼= p
′(αj [di ])p
′(di |αj [di ])
∼= p(αj [di ])
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMI ′
αj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ
F¯αj [d i ]
∼= p(αj [di ])
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMI ′
αj [di ]}p(α[di ]|αj [di ])
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ
F¯αj [d i ]
×
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ−1
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ−1
∼= p(αj [di ]|di)
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ−1
p′(vrnbg |di) ∼= p
′(vrnbg)p
′(di |vrnbg)
∼= p(vrnbg)
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMI ′
αj [di ]}p(α[di ]|vrnbg)
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ
F¯ vrnbg
∼= p(vrnbg)
∏
α∈Λ−{αj ,αMI ′
αj [di ]}p(α[di ]|vrnbg)
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ
F¯ vrnbg
×
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ−1
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ−1
∼= p(vrnbg |di)
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ−1
Now let us assume that there is another attribute αk which decreases
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
more
than that of αMI
αj [d i ],λ,T . This implies the following:
F¯αk ,αj [d i ],λ
F¯αk ,αj [d i ],λ−1
F¯αk ,vrnbg ,λ−1
F¯αk ,vrnbg ,λ
<
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ−1
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ−1
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ
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F¯αk ,αj [d i ],λ−1
F¯αk ,αj [d i ],λ
F¯αk ,vrnbg ,λ
F¯αk ,vrnbg ,λ−1
>
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ−1
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,αj [d i ],λ
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ
F¯
αMI
αj [di ],λ,T ,vrnbg ,λ−1
However, this contradicts the definition of Maximum Impact Attribute. So, we can
conclude that every generalization of the maximum impact data value causes the highest
decrease in
p(αj [di ]|di )
p(vrnbg |di )
which in turn implies that the number of data values that should
be modified is minimal¤
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the
algorithm backs up the confidential data value αj [di ] as vactual , and generalizes it to
the next level. Then, it verifies the need for suppression. It first finds the candidate
set for the confidential data value, V candidate , which includes all v ∈ V αj satisfying
the constraint Generalize(v, levelαj , Tαj ) = αj [di ]. Then, it finds p(v|di) for all v ∈
V candidate and checks the truth value of the following assertion:
p(vactual |di) > p(v|di)|∀v ∈ V candidate (4.11)
If Assertion (4.11) is true, it picks a random next best guess vrnbg from V candidate and
sets the level of generalization to 1. Next, in each iteration it finds the maximum im-
pact attribute αMI
αj [d i ] for the current level λ and generalizes the maximum impact
data value by λ levels as long as p(αj [di ]|di) > p(vrnbg |di). After each iteration, it
re-checks the truth value of Assertion (4.11) to decide whether to continue execution
or not. If Assertion (4.11) is still true after all possible maximum impact attributes are
processed, it increments the current level of generalization by 1 and repeats the gen-
eralization process until there are no levels left for generalization. After processing all
levels and maximum impact attributes, it re-checks the truth value of Assertion (4.11).
If Assertion (4.11) is still true, then it reverts all changes, generalizes the confidential
value to the next level, and repeats the above steps until either the confidential data
value is successfully suppressed or there are no levels left to generalize the confidential
data value. Finally, if the algorithm is not successful, i.e. the confidential data value
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cannot be suppressed, then tuple di is deleted from the microdata set. An overview of
the algorithm is provided in Figure 4.6.
If |V candidate | = 2 is true, then suppressing the confidential data value might result
in an adversary guessing it correctly with 100% confidence. Therefore, the decision to
suppress a confidential data value is randomized for the case where |V candidate | = 2. This
results in an adversary guessing the actual confidential data value with 50% confidence
which is the maximum uncertainty that can be achieved under such circumstances.
Lemma 4.3. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value and n be the number of attributes.
Then, the upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified by the DROPP-
G algorithm is equal to n− 1.
Proof: The DROPP-G algorithm modifies just the tuple di which has n − 1 data
values excluding the confidential data value. So, we can conclude that the DROPP-G
algorithm can generalize at most n− 1 data values for suppressing a confidential data
value ¤
Example 9. Now, let us illustrate how the DROPP-G algorithm suppresses the con-
fidential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the confidential diagnosis is generalized one level up as shown in Table
4.2.
Step 2. Next, the Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model is constructed to find the prob-
abilities p(v|di) for all v ∈ V candidate = {dyspepsia, gastritis}. The Na¨ıve Bayesian
classification model constructed using the medical records of Table 4.2 is shown in Ta-
ble 4.8. According to the model the probabilities are p(dyspepsia|d18 ) = 0, 0058, and
p(gastritis|d18 ) = 0, 0005.
Step 3. The probability p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is greater than p(gastritis|d18 ). As the con-
fidential diagnosis can be correctly predicted, the suppression process starts.
Step 4. Since the size of V candidate is equal to 2, it is randomly decided whether to
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Table 4.8: Na¨ıve Bayesian Classification Model Constructed During the Run of
DROPP-G Algorithm
p(Symptom|Diagnosis)
Step Diagnosis p(Diagnosis) I CP P N B p(Diagnosis|d18 )
2 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 2/6 3/6 2, 5/6 2/6 0, 00579
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 1/6 0, 00051
7 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 2/6 3/6 2, 5/6 3/6 0, 00868
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 3/6 0, 00154
8 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 2/6 5/6 2, 5/6 3/6 0, 01447
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 1/6 5/6 2/6 3/6 0, 00386
9 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 3/6 5/6 2, 5/6 3/6 0, 02170
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 2/6 5/6 2/6 3/6 0, 00772
10 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 3/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 04340
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 2/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 01929
11 Dyspepsia 6/12 3/6 4/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 05787
Gastritis 6/12 2/6 3/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 02894
13 Dyspepsia 6/12 5/6 4/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 07234
Gastritis 6/12 6/6 3/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 05787
14 Dyspepsia 6/12 5/6 5/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 09645
Gastritis 6/12 6/6 6/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 0, 11574
continue with the suppression or not. Let us assume that it has been decided to continue
with the suppression process.
Step 5. Let us assume that gastritis is selected as the random next best guess. From this
point on the DROPP-G algorithm will drop p(dyspepsia|d18 ) below p(gastritis|d18 ).
Step 6. To select the maximum impact attribute, the ratios for each symptom attribute
is found for λ = 1 as shown in Table 4.9. The burning symptom has the maximum
ratio. Therefore, it is selected as the maximum impact attribute.
Step 7. The burning attribute of tuple 18 is generalized one level up. With this
generalization p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to 0, 00868, and p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to
0, 00154. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
process continues with the next maximum impact attribute which is palpitation.
Step 8. The palpitation attribute of tuple 18 is generalized one level up. With this
generalization p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to 0, 01447, and p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to
0, 00386. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
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Table 4.9: Ratios Calculated to Determine the Maximum Impact Attribute for DROPP-
G
Step Result Indigestion Chest Pain Palpitation Nausea Burning
6 F¯α,Gastritis,1 3 2 5 5 3
F¯α,Gastritis,0 2 1 2 2 1
F¯α,Dyspepsia,1 4 3 5 5 3
F¯α,Dyspepsia,0 3 2 3 2, 5 2
6 Ratio 9/8 4/3 15/10 25/20 6/3
12 F¯α,Gastritis,2 6 4 6 6 5
F¯α,Gastritis,1 3 2 5 5 3
F¯α,Dyspepsia,2 5 4 6 6 4
F¯α,Dyspepsia,1 4 3 5 5 3
12 Ratio 24/15 12/8 1 1 15/12
process continues with the next maximum impact attribute which is chest pain.
Step 9. The chest pain attribute of tuple 18 is generalized one level up. With this
generalization p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to 0, 02170, and p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to
0, 00772. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
process continues with the next maximum impact attribute which is nausea.
Step 10. The nausea attribute of tuple 18 is generalized one level up. With this
generalization p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to 0, 04340, and p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to
0, 01929. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
process continues with the next maximum impact attribute which is indigestion.
Step 11. The indigestion attribute of tuple 18 is generalized one level up. With this
generalization p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to 0, 05787, and p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to
0, 02894. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
process continues with the next level λ = 2.
Step 12. To select the maximum impact attribute, the ratios for each symptom attribute
is found for λ = 2 as shown in Table 4.9. The indigestion symptom has the maximum
ratio. Therefore, it is selected as the maximum impact attribute.
Step 13. The indigestion attribute of tuple 18 is generalized one level up. With this
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Table 4.10: Academic Health Medical Records Shared with Academic Research Institute
after Execution of DROPP-G
Indigestion Chest Palpitation Nausea Burning Diagnosis
Pain
4 4 2 5 2 Dyspepsia
4 5 4 Mid-High 4 Dyspepsia
5 2 3 3 5 Dyspepsia
3 3 3 4 2 Dyspepsia
2 2 5 3 3 Dyspepsia
4 4 3 2 4 Dyspepsia
3 4 3 3 3 Gastritis
5 2 4 4 2 Gastritis
3 3 4 4 3 Gastritis
3 2 4 5 5 Gastritis
4 5 2 3 5 Gastritis
4 3 3 2 4 Gastritis
3 2 3 2 3 S.I. Ulcer
5 2 2 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 2 2 2 S.I. Ulcer
3 4 5 3 4 S.I. Ulcer
4 3 3 4 5 S.I. Ulcer
Mid-High Mid-High Mid-High Mid-High High Gastric Disease
generalization p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to 0, 07234, and p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to
0, 05787. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is still greater than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression
process continues with the next maximum impact attribute which is chest pain.
Step 14. The chest pain attribute of tuple 18 is generalized one level up. With this
generalization p(dyspepsia|d18 ) increases to 0, 09645, and p(gastritis|d18 ) increases to
0, 11574. As p(dyspepsia|d18 ) is smaller than p(gastritis|d18 ), the suppression process
stops.
The resulting microdata set can be seen in Table 4.10.
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4.2 Suppression Against Decision Tree Classifica-
tion Models
In the following, we present the HID3-G algorithm for preventing decision tree clas-
sification based inference using generalization. Although we have used ID3 in our
experiments, the proposed algorithm can be used to suppress a confidential data value
from any decision tree algorithm.
4.2.1 HID3-G Algorithm
The HID3-G algorithm aims at suppressing the confidential data value αj [di ], so that
the ID3 classifier ς id3
D−d i ,αj cannot correctly predict its actual value. Similar to the
DROPP-G algorithm, it achieves its goal by downgrading the microdata tuple di con-
taining the confidential data value.
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj [di ] be confidential. As the first step, the algo-
rithm backs up the confidential data value αj [di ] as vactual , and generalizes it to the next
level. Then, it verifies the need for suppression. It first finds the candidate set for the
confidential data value, V candidate , which includes all v ∈ V αj satisfying the constraint
Generalize(v, levelαj , Tαj ) = αj [di ]. Then, it builds the decision tree using the training
data set D[αj = v] − di where v ∈ V candidate and verifies the need for suppression. If
ς id3
D [αj=v ]−d i |v∈V candidate ,αj can correctly predict the confidential data value it calls the
recursive ID3Hide function. The ID3Hide function first checks whether the root node
is a leaf or not. If it is a leaf, and its value is different from the actual confidential data
value vactual it returns true, which in turn terminates the recursive function successfully.
Or else, it returns false. If the root node is not a leaf, then it finds the most probable
value vpi ∈ V candidate for αj [di ], and checks whether vpi is equal to vactual or not. If
the most probable value vpi is not equal to the actual confidential data value αj [di ],
it returns true. Otherwise, it further explores the child nodes of the root in order to
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suppress αj [di ]. Let the decision attribute of the root node be αroot , the most common
child of the root (i.e. the child with highest training population) be childMC and the
children matching αroot [di ] ranked with respect to their matching training population
(in descending order) be childrenMatch . If αroot [di ] = ν then it tries to suppress the
confidential data value using the most probable child node childrenMatch [0] which is ac-
tualy equal to childMC . Or else, it identifies the current generalization level of αroot [di ]
and the maximum level of generalization for αroot . Until the current generalization level
is greater than or equal to the maximum allowed level it repeats the following; It first
checks whether childrenMatch [0] is equal to childMC or not.If it is then it generalizes
αroot [di ] one level up, reidentifies the childrenMatch , and recursively tries to suppress us-
ing the child node childrenMatch [0] which is equal to childMC . Otherwise, it recursively
tries to suppress using the child node childrenMatch [0]. If the supression does not suc-
ceed, then it generalizes αroot [di ] one level up and reidentifies the childrenMatch . After
exploring all possible sub-branches, if the algorithm fails to suppress the confidential
data value, it reverts all changes and deletes the tuple di from the microdata set. An
overview of the algorithm is provided in Figure 4.7.
If |V αj | = 2 is true, then suppressing the confidential data value might result in
an adversary guessing it correctly with 100% confidence. Therefore, the decision to
suppress a confidential data value is randomized for the case where |V αj | = 2. This
results in an adversary guessing the actual confidential data value with 50% confidence
which is the maximum uncertainty that can be achieved under such circumstances.
Lemma 4.4. Let αj [di ] be the confidential data value and n be the number of attributes.
Then, the upper bound for the number of data values that can be modified by the HID3-G
algorithm is equal to n− 1.
Proof: The HID3-G algorithm modifies just the tuple di which has n − 1 data values
excluding the confidential data value. So, we can conclude that the HID3-G algorithm
can generalize at most n− 1 data values for suppressing a confidential data value ¤
Example 10. For this specific example, let us assume that the decision tree built using
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
T , the taxonomy set for each attribute
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data value
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
vactual = αj [di ]
λαj = 1
While λαj <= FindMaxLevel(T, αj ) {
αj [di ] = Generalize(vactual , λαj , Tαj )
V candidate = all v ∈ V αj satisfying Generalize(v, λαj , Tαj ) = αj [di ]
root=Build the decision tree using ID3(D[αj [d] = v]− di |v ∈ V candidate)
vpi =Classify(root, di )
If vpi = vactual {
If |V candidate | = 2 {
Randomly decide whether or not to continue suppression
Return true
}
If success =ID3Hide(root, T, vactual , di )
break
}
Increment λαj by 1
}
If not success
Delete tuple di
END
BOOL ID3Hide(root, T, vactual , di )
{
If root is a leaf return root.value 6= vactual
vpi =Classify(root, di )
If vpi 6= vactual return true
αroot = decision attribute of the root
childMC = most common child of the root
childrenMatch = children matching αroot [di ] ranked wrt. training set size
If αroot [di ] = ν return ID3Hide(childrenMatch [0])
Else {
λ =Current generalization level of αroot
MaxLevel =FindMaxLevel(T, αroot )
Do {
If childMC <> childrenMatch [0]
If ID3Hide(childrenMatch [0]) return true
Else {
Increment λ by 1
Generalize(αroot [di ], λ, Tαroot )
childrenMatch = children containing all possible values of αroot [di ] ranked wrt. their training set size
}
Else {
Increment λ by 1
Generalize(αroot [di ], λ, Tαroot )
If ID3Hide(childrenMatch [0]) return true
}
}
While λ < MaxLevel
Revert changes to αroot [di ]
return false
}
Figure 4.7: Pseudocode of HID3-G Algorithm
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Nausea
1;2 3;4;5 1;2 3;4;5
Nausea
Burning
1;2 3 4 5
Node 5
Category % n
Dyspepsia 0,0 0
Gastritis 100,0 4
Total 20,0 4
Node 6
Category % n
Dyspepsia 100,0 3
Gastritis 0,0 0
Total 15,0 3
Node 7
Category % n
Dyspepsia 100,0 2
Gastritis 0,0 0
Total 10,0 2
Node 8
Category % n
Dyspepsia 0,0 0
Gastritis 100,0 3
Total 15,0 3
Node 4
Category % n
Dyspepsia 40,0 2
Gastritis 60,0 3
Total 25,0 5
Node 3
Category % n
Dyspepsia 100,0 4
Gastritis 0,0 0
Total 20,0 4
Node 2
Category % n
Dyspepsia 42,8 3
Gastritis 57,2 4
Total 35,0 7
Node 1
Category % n
Dyspepsia 25,0 1
Gastritis 75,0 3
Total 20,0 4
Node 0
Category % n
Dyspepsia 50,0 10
Gastritis 50,0 10
Total 100,0 20
Figure 4.8: An Example Decision Tree
the training data set is as shown in 4.8, and the tuple with confidential diagnosis is
as shown Table 4.11 Now, let us illustrate how the HID3-G algorithm suppresses the
confidential diagnosis.
Step 1. Initially, the confidential diagnosis is generalized one level up as Gastric
Disease.
Step 2. Next, the ID3 classification model is constructed using the tuples whose
diagnosis ∈ {dyspepsia, gastritis}. Let us assume that the decision tree built using
the training data set is as shown in 4.8. According to the model vpi = dyspepsia.
Step 3. As the confidential data value can be correctly predicted,the suppression process
starts.
Step 4. Since the size of V candidate = {dyspepsia, gastritis} is equal to 2, it is randomly
decided whether to continue with the suppression or not. Let us assume that it has
been decided to continue with the suppression process.
Table 4.11: Tuple Whose Confidential Diagnosis To Be Suppressed By HID3-G
Indigestion Chest Palpitation Nausea Burning Diagnosis
Pain
4 4 2 3 3 Dyspepsia
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Step 5. Starting from the root=node 0, the ID3Hide function checks whether it is
possible to correctly predict the confidential diagnosis or not. Since it can be correctly
predicted using the path burning = 3∧nausea = 3, the suppression process continues.
Step 6. The most common child node of the root and the matching child node are both
found to be node 2.
Step 7. Since the matching child is equal to the most common child node of the root,
the burning attribute is generalized one level up, and ID3Hide function is recursively
called with root=node 2.
Step 8. Starting from the subtree root=node 2, the ID3Hide function checks whether it
is possible to correctly predict the confidential diagnosis or not. Since the diagnosis can
be correctly predicted using the path nausea = 3, the suppression process continues.
Step 9. The most common child node of the root and the matching child node are
found to be node 5 and node 6 respectively.
Step 10. Since the matching child is not equal to the most common child node of the
root, the ID3Hide function is recursively called with the matching child root=node 6.
Step 11. Since the root=node 6 is a leaf node, and its value is equal to the actual
confidential data value, False is returned from the recursive ID3Hide call.
Step 12. Since the recursive call to ID3Hide is not successful, nausea attribute is
generalized one level up to be Mid-High.
Step 13. The matching child node is found to be node 6.
Step 14. Since the matching child is not equal to the most common child node of the
root, the ID3Hide function is recursively called with the matching child root=node 6.
Step 15. As root=node 6 is a leaf, the ID3Hide function checks whether the most
probable value, i.e. dyspepsia, and the confidential diagnosis are equal or not. As they
are equal, the function returns from the recursive call signaling an unsuccessful run.
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Step 16. Since the recursive call to ID3Hide is not successful, the nausea attribute is
generalized one level up to be ?.
Step 17. The matching children nodes are found to be node 5 and node 6.
Step 18. As, the first matching child is equal to the most common child node of the
root, the ID3Hide function is recursively called with the most common child root=node
5.
Step 19. As root=node 5 is a leaf, the ID3Hide function checks whether the most
probable value, i.e. gastritis, and the confidential diagnosis are equal or not. Since they
are not equal, the function returns from the recursive call signaling a successful run.
The resulting microdata tuple can be seen in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Tuple Whose Confidential Diagnosis Suppressed By HID3-G
Indigestion Chest Palpitation Nausea Burning Diagnosis
Pain
4 4 2 ? Mid-High Gastric Disease
4.3 Suppression of Multiple Confidential Data Val-
ues
In the following, we present the enhanced versions of DECP-G and DROPP-G algo-
rithms for preventing probabilistic classification based inference. The proposed algo-
rithms aim to reduce to side-effects while suppressing multiple confidential data values.
4.3.1 e-DECP-G Algorithm
The enhanced DECP-G algorithm aims at suppressing multiple confidential data val-
ues, so that none of them can be correctly predicted by the downgraded classification
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model ςnb
D ′,αj . The proposed algorithm reduces the side-effects of the original DECP-G
algorithm when (1) all confidential data values belong to a single attribute, and (2) all
confidential data values have the same value.
The algorithm works as follows: Let αj be the confidential attribute, S ⊂ D be the
set of tuples for which αj , satisfying the constraint αj [d] = conf value for all d ∈ S,is
confidential. As the first step, the algorithm generalizes all confidential data values one
level up. Then, it identifies the candidate maximum impact data values, and initializes
their primary and secondary impacts along with counts. The primary impact is the
number of tuples which will be affected (i.e. the probabilities will be affected) if an
instance of the maximum impact attribute is generalized. The secondary impact, on
the other hand is the ratio that is used to determine the maximum impact attribute.
Next, for each tuple d ∈ S, the need for suppression is verified by finding p(v|d) for all
v ∈ V candidate and checking the truth value of the following assertion:
p(αj [d]|d) > p(v|d)|∀v ∈ V candidate − αj [d] (4.12)
If Assertion (4.12) is true for a tuple d ∈ S, it picks a random next best guess vrnbg
d ,
from V candidate . Next, the candidate maximum impact data values are sorted. Different
from the DECP-G, which uses only the secondary impact to determine which maximum
impact data value to use, e-DECP-G also uses the primary impact in order to guarantee
suppression of maximum number of confidential data values with a single iteration.
With maximum impact values sorted, the rest of the execution is quite similar to the
original DECP-G which involves replacement of maximum impact data value instances,
re-calculation of probabilities and re-checking of Assertion (4.12). An overview of the
algorithm is provided in Figure 4.9.
4.3.2 e-DROPP-G Algorithm
The enhanced DROPP-G algorithm aims at suppressing multiple confidential data val-
ues at a time so that none of them can be correctly predicted by the corresponding
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
T , the taxonomy set for each attribute
MaxLevel, the maximum depth among the taxonomy sets
S, the set of tuples for which αj is confidential
αj , the attribute containing the confidential data values
conf value, the value of confidential attribute αj ∈ S
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
vactual = conf value
λαj = 1
While λαj <= FindMaxLevel(T, αj ) {
For each tuple d ∈ S
αj [d] = Generalize(vactual , λαj , Tαj , k)
e-DECP-G(D,T, vactual , S, αj , λαj ,MaxLevel) break
Increment λαj by 1
}
For each tuple d ∈ S
Delete tuple d
END
BOOL e-DECP-G(D,T ,vactual ,di ,αj ,λαj ,MaxLevel,k)
{
λ = 1
While λ <= MaxLevel {
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj {
For each possible value of vα ∈ V α {
Create the maximum impact data value candidate MIV [α][vα]
Set MIV [α][vα].primary impact to 0
F 1 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧ α[d] = Generalize(vα, λ− 1, Tα)]|
F 2 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧Descendant(α[d], Generalize(vα, λ, Tα))]|
F 3 = |D[αj [d] = vactual ∧Descendant(α[d], Generalize(vα, λ− 1, Tα)]|
Set MIV [α][vα].secondary impact =
F 1+F3−1
F 1+F 3
× F 2
F 2−1
Set MIV [α][vα].count = F 1
}
V candidate = all v ∈ V αj satisfying Generalize(v, λαj , Tαj ) = αj [S[0]]
For each tuple d ∈ S {
Find probabilities p(v|d) for all v ∈ V candidate
If not p(vactual |d) > p(v|d) | ∀v ∈ V candidate Remove d from S
Else If |V candidate | = 2
Randomly decide whether to suppress the confidential data value and remove d from S
if decision = ‘not suppress’
If d ∈ S {
Select top-k from V candidate to form Ωk
αj [d]
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg among Ωk
αj [d]
For each attribute α ∈ Λ− αj
Increment MIV [α][α[d]].primary impact by 1
}
}
Sort MIV first by primary impact in descending order, then by secondary impact in ascending order
For each maximum impact value miv ∈MIV {
While |S| > 0 and (miv.count > 1 or λ > 1) {
Generalize the next instance of miv
miv.count−−
For each tuple d ∈ S {
Update p(αj [d]|d)
If p(αj [d]|d) ≤ p(vrnbg
d |d) Remove d from S
}
}
If |S| = 0 break
}
}
}
Figure 4.9: Pseudocode of e-DECP-G Algorithm
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classification models ςnb
D ,α. The proposed algorithm reduces the side-effects of the
original DROPP-G algorithm when all confidential data values belong to a single tuple.
The algorithm works as follows: Let [di ] be the tuple containing multiple confidential
data values, and S be the set of attributes containing a confidential data value in di .
As the first step, the algorithm verifies the need for suppression for each confidential
data value. More specifically, for each α ∈ S, it finds p(v|di) where v ∈ V candidate and
checks the truth value of the following assertion:
p(α[di ]|di) > p(v|di)|∀v ∈ V candidate − α[di ] (4.13)
If Assertion (4.13) is true, it picks a random next best guess vrnbg
α from V candidate .
Next, it identifies the candidate maximum impact data values, and initializes their
impacts on each confidential value. To identify the maximum impact data value in each
iteration, the impacts of candidates are averaged and sorted. With maximum impact
values sorted, the rest of the execution is quite similar to the original DROPP-G which
involves generalization of maximum impact data value instances of di , re-calculation
of probabilities and re-checking of Assertion (4.13). An overview of the algorithm is
provided in Figure 4.10.
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INPUT: D, the microdata set
T , the taxonomy set for each attribute
MaxLevel, the maximum depth among the taxonomy sets
di , the tuple containing the confidential data value
S, the set of attributes containing a confidential data value in di
k, degree of suppression
OUTPUT: D′, the new data set
BEGIN
For each attribute α ∈ S
vactual
α = α[di ]
λS = 1
While λS <= MaxLevel {
λ = 1
While λ <= MaxLevel {
For each attribute α ∈ S {
α[di ] = Generalize(vactual
α, λS , Tα)
V candidate
α = all v ∈ V α satisfying Generalize(v, λS , Tα) = α[di ]
Find probabilities p(v|di ) for all v ∈ V candidate
α
If not p(vactual
α|di ) > p(v|di )|∀v ∈ V candidate
α Remove α from S
Else If |V candidate
α| = 2
Randomly decide whether to suppress the confidential data value and remove α from S
if decision = ‘not suppress’
Select top-k from V candidate
α to form Ωk
α[d i ]
Pick a random next best guess vrnbg
α among Ωk
α[d i ]
For each non confidential attribute α′
If α′[di ]! = ν {
Create the maximum impact data value candidate MIV [α][α′]
Set MIV [α′][α].αMI to α
′
F¯α′,vrnbgα,λ = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[α[d] = vrnbg
α ∧ α′[d] = Generalize(α′[di ], λ, Tα′ )]
F¯α′,vrnbgα,λ−1 = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[α[d] = vrnbg
α ∧ α′[d] = Generalize(α′[di ], λ− 1, Tα′ )]
F¯α′,vactualα,λ = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[α[d] = vactual
α ∧ α′[d] = Generalize(α′[di ], λ, Tα′ )]
F¯α′,vactualα,λ−1 = updated frequency count of tuples satisfying
D[α[d] = vactual
α ∧ α′[d] = Generalize(α′[di ], λ− 1, Tα′ )]
Set MIV [α′][α].impact to
F¯α′,vrnbg
α,λ
F¯α′,vrnbg
α,λ−1
×
F¯α′,vactual
α,λ−1
F¯α′,vactual
α,λ
}
}
}
For each non confidential attribute α′
Find average impact MIV [α′].average impact
Sort maximum impact attributes by average impact in descending order
For each maximum impact value miv ∈MIV {
Generalize the maximum impact data value miv.αMI [di ] by λ levels
For each confidential attribute α ∈ S {
Update the probabilities
If p(α[di ]|di ) ≤ p(vrnbg
α|di ) Remove α from S
}
If |S| = 0 break
}
If |S| = 0 break
Increment λ by 1
}
If |S| = 0 break
Increment λS by 1
}
If |S| > 0 Delete tuple di
END
Figure 4.10: Pseudocode of e-DROPP-G Algorithm
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Chapter 5
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This chapter presents the experimental results. The primary objective of the experi-
ments is to compare the suppression algorithms in terms of their CPU time performance,
rate of success, information loss, and uncertainty.
5.1 Data Sets and Implementation Details
In order to conduct the experiments we selected two data sets from the University
of California at Irvine repository [2]; the Wisconsin Breast Cancer [38] and the Car
Evaluation data set. Table 5.1 provides a description of the data sets including the
number of instances, the number of attributes, and the number of unknowns.
We implemented the proposed algorithms using the C++ programming language.
To evaluate the performance of the algorithms, we performed experiments on a 2.67
GHz Intel PC with 4GB of memory running the Windows 7 operating system. As the
Table 5.1: Data Sets Used In the Experiments
Data Set No. of Instances No. of Attributes No. of Unknowns
Wisconsin Breast Cancer 699 10 16
Car Evaluation 1728 7 0
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Table 5.2: Average Execution Times of Proposed Algorithms
Average Execution Time (in ms)
Data Set DECP INCP DROPP HID3
W. Breast Cancer 0,129 0,127 0,131 0,129
Car Evaluation 0,036 0,036 0,037 0,036
DECP-G INCP-G DROPP-G HID3-G
W. Breast Cancer 0,159 0,160 0,169 0,159
suppression algorithms contain random components, the experimental results presented
are averages of five realizations unless stated otherwise. Moreover, in order to illustrate
the power of the algorithms we choose to suppress confidential data values for which
the domain size of the corresponding attribute is greater than 2.
5.2 Results and Analysis Of Algorithms
In this study, we first measured the average execution times required to suppress a
confidential data value. In order to find the average execution times, we suppressed
a data value from each instance of the data sets and averaged the CPU time results.
The results, as depicted in Table 5.2, show that the suppression algorithms performed
remarkably similar with respect to execution time.
Another performance criterion is the percent of successful suppressions. The sup-
pression process is successful if and only if the confidential data value is suppressed
without deleting the microdata tuple containing it. For each suppression algorithm, we
first measured the percent of successful suppressions against the algorithm’s primary1
classification model. As illustrated in Table 5.3, the proposed algorithms successfully
suppressed all confidential data values with respect to their primary classification model.
Next, we investigated the correctness of the following hypotheses:
1Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model for DECP, INCP, DROPP, DECP-G, INCP-G, and DROPP-G
algorithms, and ID3 classification model for HID3 and HID3-G algorithms.
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Table 5.3: Success of Proposed Algorithms Against Different Classification Models
Classification Percent of Successful Suppressions
Data Set Model DECP INCP DROPP HID3
Na¨ıve Bayesian 100% 100% 100% 84%
W. Breast Cancer ID3 77% 75% 90% 100%
SVM 41% 41% 89% 86%
Na¨ıve Bayesian 100% 100% 100% 65%
Car Evaluation ID3 86% 84% 85% 100%
SVM 65% 56% 88% 80%
DECP-G INCP-G DROPP-G HID3-G
Na¨ıve Bayesian 100% 100% 100% 81%
W. Breast Cancer ID3 74% 73% 85% 100%
SVM 40% 39% 87% 84%
Hypothesis 5.1. Algorithms suppressing confidential data values against probabilistic
classification models also block the decision tree classification based inference.
Hypothesis 5.2. Algorithms suppressing confidential data values against decision tree
classification models also block the probabilistic classification based inference.
Hypothesis 5.3. Algorithms suppressing confidential data values against probabilis-
tic or decision tree classification models also block inference based on more complex
classification models(e.g. SVM).
We measured the percent of successful suppressions achieved by each algorithm
against (1) its secondary2 classification model, and (2) SVM using the Joachim’s SVM-
Struct3 [58], as it is a more powerful classification technique. As illustrated in Table
5.3, the proposed algorithms exceeded a success rate of 65% against their secondary
classification models, thus proving the correctness of Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2. For SVM,
the success rates range from 39% to 89%. This proves that the proposed algorithms
still protect confidential data values against more powerful classification techniques.
2ID3 classification model for DECP, INCP, DROPP, DECP-G, INCP-G, and DROPP-G algorithms,
and Na¨ıve Bayesian classification model for HID3 and HID3-G algorithms.
3Linear kernel has been used while training.
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Figure 5.1: Average Direct Distance Results of Proposed Algorithms
The next performance criterion is the information loss caused by the suppression
algorithms. We used three evaluation metrics in order to measure the information
loss: the Direct Distance, Sum of Kullback Leibler Distances, and Average Change
in Mutual Information. The details of these information loss metrics can be found in
Section 2.4.1. As a benchmark, we used the Na¨ıve Row Deletion (NRD) algorithm. The
NRD algorithm suppresses a confidential data value via deleting the microdata tuple to
which it belongs, i.e. replacing each and every data value forming the microdata tuple,
including the confidential data value, with ν.
The first information loss metric we used was the average direct distance which
measures the average number of changes introduced due to suppression of a single con-
fidential data value. The average direct distance results for the suppression algorithms
are shown in Figure 5.1. As can be seen from the figure, the HID3 and HID3-G algo-
rithms cause the least amount of information loss in terms of average direct distance
followed by the DROPP and DROPP-G algorithms. Actually, all of these algorithms
are bounded by the NRD algorithm, as they aim at downgrading the microdata tuple
instead of the classification models. On the other hand, the DECP, INCP, DECP-G and
INCP-G algorithms perform relatively worse than the others, as they aim at downgrad-
ing the classification model instead. Since DECP-G, INCP-G, DROPP-G, and HID3-G
aim at minimizing the level of generalization per attribute value, they perform slightly
worse than their deletion counterparts.
Apart from the average direct distance, we also measured the total direct distance
92
0500
1000
1500
2000
2500
5 10 15 20 25 30
DECP INCP DROPP HID3 NRD
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
5 10 15 20 25 30
DECP-G INCP-G DROPP-G HID3-G NRD
(a) Results for W. Breast Cancer Data Set
0
250
500
750
1000
5 10 15 20 25 30
DECP INCP DROPP HID3 NRD
(b) Results for Car Evaluation Data Set
Figure 5.2: Total Direct Distance Results of Proposed Algorithms
versus the number of confidential data values suppressed. We realized this experiment
for two sets of confidential data values one randomly selected from the Wisconsin Breast
Cancer data set and one randomly selected from the Car Evaluation4 data set. The
same set of confidential data values are used throughout the rest of the experiments
measuring the information loss and uncertainty. The results are shown in Figure 5.2.
Among suppression algorithms employing deletion strategy, the HID3 algorithm causes
the least amount of information loss in terms of direct distance followed by the DROPP,
INCP, and DECP algorithms. The ordering is similar among suppression algorithms
employing generalization strategy. However, these algorithms perform slightly worse
4Since the domain size of the attributes are small, this data set cannot be used to test the perfor-
mance of suppression algorithms employing generalization modification strategy.
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than their deletion counterparts.
The second information loss metric we used was the sum of Kullback Leibler dis-
tances which measures the distance between the first order probability distributions
of the original and the new data sets. The performance of suppression algorithms in
terms of sum of Kullback Leibler distances is shown in Figure 5.3. Among suppression
algorithms employing deletion strategy, the HID3 algorithm causes the least amount of
information loss in terms of sum of Kullback Leibler distances followed by the DROPP,
INCP, and DECP algorithms. Unlike the direct distance, the algorithms employing
generalization modification strategy perform better than their deletion counterparts
with respect to sum of Kullback Leibler distances.
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Figure 5.3: Sum of Kullback Leibler Distance Results of Proposed Algorithms
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Figure 5.4: Average Change in Mutual Information Results of Proposed Algorithms
The last information loss metric we used was the average change in mutual in-
formation which measures the average distance between the second order probability
distributions of the original and modified data sets. The performance of suppression al-
gorithms in terms of average change in mutual information is shown in Figure 5.4. The
results show that; (1) the HID3-G and HID3 algorithms distort correlations least fol-
lowed by the DROPP-G, DROPP, INCP-G, INCP, DECP-G, and DECP algorithms,
and (2) algorithms downgrading the classification model prevent inference of confi-
dential data values better than the ones downgrading the tuple itself, as they distort
correlations within the data sets, (3) algorithms employing generalization modification
strategy perform better than their deletion counterparts.
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Figure 5.5: Sum of Conditional Entropy Results of Proposed Algorithms
The final performance criterion is the uncertainty introduced by the suppression
algorithms. We used the sum of conditional entropies in order to measure the expected
value of uncertainty introduced into the modified data sets. The performance of sup-
pression algorithms in terms of sum of conditional entropies is shown in Figure 5.5.
The results show that; (1) the HID3-G and HID3 algorithms introduce the least un-
certainty followed by the DROPP-G, DROPP, INCP-G, INCP, DECP-G, and DECP
algorithms, and (2) algorithms downgrading the classification model prevent inference
of confidential data values better than the ones downgrading the tuple itself, as they
cause more uncertainty within the data sets, (3) algorithms employing generalization
modification strategy introduce less uncertainty than their deletion counterparts.
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We can summarize the presented experimental results as follows:
1. There is a tradeoff between the rate of successful suppressions and the information
loss caused by the suppression process.
2. The DECP and DECP-G algorithms achieve the highest success rate while causing
the highest amount of information loss and uncertainty. This justifies Lemma 3.1
and Lemma 4.1 which state that the upper bound for the number of data values
that can be modified by these algorithms is equal to (n− 1)(N − 1) < nm.
3. The INCP and INCP-G algorithms achieve the second highest success rate while
causing the second highest information loss and uncertainty. It is followed by the
DROPP, DROPP-G, HID3 and HID3-G algorithms. This ordering is completely
due to (1) the characteristics of the Wisconsin Breast Cancer and Car Evaluation
data sets satisfying the inequality m >> n, i.e. the number of transactions is
much more than the number of attributes, and (2) the upper bounds for the
number of data values that can be modified by the algorithms. For a data set
satisfying the inequality n >> m, the order of success, information loss, and
uncertainty will be reversed.
4. The success rate of algorithms employing generalization strategy is similar to their
deletion counterparts.
5. The information loss caused by algorithms employing generalization strategy is
less than their deletion counterparts. The only exception to this is the direct dis-
tance: algorithms employing generalization strategy change more attribute values
than the one employing deletion strategy. Since DECP-G, INCP-G, DROPP-G,
and HID3-G aim at minimizing the level of generalization per attribute value,
they perform slightly worse than their deletion counterparts in terms of direct
distance.
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5.3 Results and Analysis of Hybrid Algorithms
In this study, we merged each Na¨ıve Bayesian suppression algorithm with the Decision
Tree suppression algorithms in a round robin fashion5, to demonstrate the performance
of the hybrid algorithms against both classification models.
First, we measured the percent of successful suppressions achieved by each hybrid
algorithm against both classification models. The hybrid algorithms successfully sup-
pressed all confidential data values with respect to both classification models, and
achieved 100% success rate. Next, we measured the average direct distance for the hy-
brid algorithms as shown in Figure 5.6. The HID3+DROPP and HID3-G+DROPP-G
algorithms cause the least amount of information loss in terms of average direct distance
followed by the HID3+INCP, HID3-G+INCP-G, HID3+DECP, and HID3-G+DECP-G
algorithms.
5.4 Results and Analysis of Enhanced Algorithms
In this study, we also enhanced the DECP, DECP-G, DROPP, and DROPP-G algo-
rithms to suppress multiple confidential data values, and thus introduce less side effects.
5For example, for HID3+DECP hybrid algorithm, first the HID3 algorithm is executed to suppress
the confidential data value against decision tree classification based inference. Then, the DECP al-
gorithm is executed to suppress the confidential data value against probabilistic classification based
inference.
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In order to demonstrate the performance of the enhanced algorithms compared to the
original ones, we used two new sets of randomly chosen confidential data values. The
first set of confidential data values is used to compare the performance of DECP vari-
ants, while the second set is used to compare the performance of DROPP variants.
Using these two sets we measured the total number of changes introduced due to sup-
pression of multiple confidential data values. As shown in Figure 5.7, the enhanced
algorithms performed remarkably better than the original versions, and reduced the
side-effects by nearly 50%.
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Figure 5.7: Total Direct Distance Results of Enhanced Algorithms on W. Breast Cancer
Data Set
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Chapter 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In tandem with the advances in networking and storage technologies, the private sector
as well as the public sector has increased their efforts to gather, manipulate, and com-
modify information on a large scale. These pervasive data harvesting efforts coupled
with the increasing need to share the data with other institutions or with public raised
concerns about privacy. Widespread usage of powerful data analysis tools and data
mining techniques, enabling institutions to extract previously unknown and strategi-
cally useful information from huge collections of data sets, and thus gain competitive
advantages, has also contributed to the fears about privacy. Data mining techniques
can be used for many reasons including but not limited to national security warning
and national security decision making [1] for government agencies, and providing bet-
ter business intelligence and customer relationship management for enterprises. On the
other hand, they can also be used by adversaries to infer hidden confidential informa-
tion about individuals from the disclosed data sets, and thus pose a great threat to
privacy.
In this dissertation, we have precisely formulated the problem of suppressing a
confidential data item, and designed algorithms to avoid probabilistic and decision tree
classification based inference. We have selected Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 as typical
representatives of probabilistic and decision tree classifiers respectively, and developed
our algorithms accordingly. More specifically we have designed and implemented the
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following algorithms:
1. The DECP and INCP algorithms suppress a single confidential data value against
Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers. These two algorithms downgrade the Na¨ıve Bayesian
classifiers using the deletion modification strategy. Details of DECP and INCP
algorithms are also presented in [7;8].
2. The DROPP and HID3 algorithms suppress a single confidential data value against
Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 classifiers respectively. These two algorithms downgrade
the microdata tuple containing the confidential data value using the deletion mod-
ification strategy. Details of DROPP and HID3 algorithms are also presented in
[7;8].
3. The DECP-G and INCP-G algorithms suppress a single confidential data value
against Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers. These two algorithms downgrade the Na¨ıve
Bayesian classifiers using the generalization modification strategy.
4. The DROPP-G and HID3-G algorithms suppress a single confidential data value
against Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 classifiers respectively. These two algorithms
downgrade the microdata tuple containing the confidential data value using the
generalization modification strategy.
5. The e-DECP and e-DROPP algorithms suppress multiple confidential data values
against Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers using the deletion modification strategy.
6. The e-DECP-G and e-DROPP-G algorithms suppress multiple confidential data
values against Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers using the generalization modification
strategy.
Our experimental results presented in this dissertation have shown that:
• The proposed algorithms are able to suppress confidential data values, so that
they cannot be predicted by their target classification models.
101
• The proposed algorithms are also able to block the inference channels introduced
by other classification models.
• The hybrid versions of the algorithms are able to block the inference channels in-
troduced by Na¨ıve Bayesian and ID3 classifiers with substantially less side effects.
• Similarly, the generalization versions of the algorithms distort the microdata less
when compared to their deletion counterparts.
• The enhanced versions of the algorithms are able to suppress multiple confidential
data values and reduce the side effects by 50%.
6.1 Future Work
Some promising directions for future work include:
1. Development of suppression algorithms to avoid different classification algorithms
based inference. Specifically, it would be interesting to design variants of suppres-
sion algorithms against Bag-of-words classifiers, Bayesian Networks, Logistic Re-
gression Classifiers, and Hyperplane classifiers (Perceptron, Winnow Perceptron,
and Support Vector Machines).
2. Development of algorithms to suppress multiple confidential data values that are
not necessarily instances of the same attribute, or do not have the same value, or
do not belong to the same tuple.
3. Development of a generic suppression technique which employs information the-
oretic concepts for distorting the microdata. Such a technique should be able to
avoid any classification algorithm based inference.
4. Development of suppression algorithms to handle evolving (i.e. continuously up-
dated) microdata.
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5. Development of suppression algorithms that can hide confidential data values
from horizontally or vertically distributed microdata.
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